Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> <strong>and</strong> Counter-insurgency: Back to <strong>the</strong> Basics
1960s. 511 The VNAF maintained a solid combat performance throughout <strong>the</strong> war. As
<strong>the</strong> US turned <strong>the</strong> war over to <strong>the</strong> South Vietnamese, <strong>the</strong> VNAF took up <strong>the</strong> burden.
In <strong>the</strong> spring of 1972 <strong>the</strong> VNAF flew thous<strong>and</strong>s of sorties in <strong>the</strong> successful air effort to
defeat <strong>the</strong> gr<strong>and</strong> North Vietnamese spring offensive. However, <strong>the</strong> history of building
<strong>the</strong> VNAF also highlights some of <strong>the</strong> complexities in supporting a less developed
ally. The VNAF’s biggest problems were shortages of trained personnel, mechanics
<strong>and</strong> parts. While <strong>the</strong> VNAF had plenty of aircraft, operational rates were low due to
a weak infrastructure. 512
Coming out of Vietnam, <strong>the</strong> US carried out a very successful effort to build an effective air
force in El Salvador during that nation’s insurgency from 1981 to 1992. The Salvadoran
<strong>Air</strong> Force was primarily a helicopter force for troop transport with some close support <strong>and</strong>
medevac capabilities. The effort to increase <strong>the</strong> size <strong>and</strong> effectiveness of <strong>the</strong> Salvadoran
<strong>Air</strong> force, which US trainers <strong>and</strong> advisors made possible, gave <strong>the</strong> Salvadoran Army <strong>the</strong>
ability to quickly respond to rebel attacks. The provision of medevac helicopters raised
<strong>the</strong> morale <strong>and</strong> fighting effectiveness of <strong>the</strong> Salvadoran Army. Finally, <strong>the</strong> Salvadoran <strong>Air</strong>
Force gunships provided effective close air support to ground troops. 513
The El Salvador
experience is a good model of doing it right.
Yet <strong>the</strong> US <strong>Air</strong> Force’s new counter-insurgency doctrine, <strong>Air</strong> Force Doctrine Document
2-3, Irregular Warfare (August 2007), draws little on <strong>the</strong> historical experience of past US
success in counter-insurgency <strong>and</strong> focuses instead on highlighting how <strong>the</strong> USAF can
fight insurgents in its 94 pages. The vital mission of training <strong>the</strong> host nation air forces to
fight <strong>the</strong>ir own war is hardly mentioned. When <strong>the</strong> mission is mentioned on a few pages,
it is discussed only in <strong>the</strong> most general terms. In contrast, <strong>the</strong> new Army <strong>and</strong> Marine
Corps counter-insurgency doctrine contains a more detailed discussion concerning
<strong>the</strong> requirements for building indigenous air forces. Although all <strong>the</strong> major counterinsurgency
<strong>the</strong>ories of <strong>the</strong> last five decades emphasise building <strong>the</strong> host nation forces
<strong>and</strong> capabilities as a key to success, <strong>the</strong> US military tends to ignore this. Currently <strong>the</strong>
USAF has only a small force of less than 300 personnel to cover <strong>the</strong> worldwide mission to
training allied nation air forces. In confronting counter-insurgency today, all <strong>the</strong> services
need to revamp <strong>the</strong>ir doctrine to place considerably more effort into <strong>the</strong> training <strong>and</strong>
advisory mission. I can think of few US efforts that have paid off more h<strong>and</strong>somely at
relatively little expense in manpower <strong>and</strong> equipment.
Appropriate Equipment for Allied Nations
The Army/Marine counter-insurgency doctrine is far superior to <strong>the</strong> new <strong>Air</strong> Force
doctrine in its discussions about equipping host nation air forces. FM 3-24 recommends
<strong>the</strong> use of inexpensive, low-tech aircraft <strong>and</strong> technology for less developed allies facing
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”