Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

The RAF in Counter-<strong>Insurgency</strong> Warfare: British Intervention in Greece, 1944-45
<strong>the</strong> magnificent work of all branches of <strong>the</strong> RAF, work which has
perhaps been more vital to <strong>the</strong> Army than in most o<strong>the</strong>r operations
our two Services have undertaken toge<strong>the</strong>r.
When <strong>the</strong> rebellion broke out, III Corps was not only very weak
in troops but had hardly any ammunition with which to fight,
since it had come to Greece almost on a peace footing. Without
<strong>the</strong> continuous support given from <strong>the</strong> air, our troops would have
had difficulty in holding out until reinforcements arrived. It was air
transport which saved a dangerous situation in <strong>the</strong> first few days
by bringing in an Infantry Brigade, ammunition <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r much
needed stores….
Will you convey to all ranks under your comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> thanks of
myself <strong>and</strong> my troops. Our thanks are due not only to those who
fought in <strong>the</strong> air but also to <strong>the</strong> RAF Regiment, to <strong>the</strong> ground staffs
of whom so few had to do so much <strong>and</strong> to many o<strong>the</strong>rs … The RAF
have certainly helped <strong>the</strong> Army on a greater scale in o<strong>the</strong>r operations,
but <strong>the</strong> help <strong>the</strong>y have given here has never been bettered. 228
The success of air power in this counter-insurgency campaign is best encapsulated by
<strong>the</strong> RAF’s latest motif: “agile, adaptable <strong>and</strong> capable”. The RAF was able to adapt quickly
to operational imperatives, by switching from its original role (supporting <strong>the</strong> Army in
“law <strong>and</strong> order”) to a variety of roles, some of which were performed simultaneously: air
interdiction, aerial reconnaissance, air transport <strong>and</strong> urban close air support. The latter
was a completely new role for most of <strong>the</strong> aircrews, especially as <strong>the</strong>y were required to
perform urban close air support in accordance with unique Rules of Engagement <strong>and</strong>
concerns over collateral damage. The rapid change from one role to ano<strong>the</strong>r attests to <strong>the</strong>
capability, resolve <strong>and</strong> courage of <strong>the</strong> aircrews concerned. Yet perhaps <strong>the</strong> most impressive
facet of this campaign was <strong>the</strong> new thinking which underpinned <strong>the</strong>se operations. The
experience was unique, <strong>and</strong> required innovative tactics <strong>and</strong> processes. Many important
lessons were learned, lessons which <strong>the</strong> RAF <strong>and</strong> USAF feel <strong>the</strong>y have “discovered” in
recent operations in Iraq <strong>and</strong> Afghanistan. 229 The most significant lessons were <strong>the</strong>se:
• <strong>Air</strong> power is <strong>the</strong> key enabler <strong>and</strong> force multiplier in counter-insurgency
warfare because of its flexibility, speed of response <strong>and</strong> ability to deliver weapons
with precision.
• <strong>Air</strong> mobility provided by air transport is crucial to defeating an
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”