Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Insurgency</strong>: Some Preliminary Thoughts - Joel Hayward
for example. Even if one believes that a carefully nuanced air campaign has <strong>the</strong> ability to
change <strong>the</strong> mind of national leaders by threatening or conducting attacks that will hurt or
cost <strong>the</strong>m too much, in counter-insurgency campaigns air forces are ordinarily supporting
<strong>the</strong> national leaders whilst <strong>the</strong>y struggles against troublesome sub-state actors. Therefore,
air forces certainly cannot damage national infrastructure or high-value “public” objects.
Moreover, <strong>the</strong> misbehaving sub-state actors own almost nothing valuable in a traditional
sense that air forces can use as objects of coercive leverage.
A denial campaign is equally problematic. <strong>Air</strong> forces would ordinarily undertake this type
of campaign if coercion failed <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>y had to prevent or stop a state from doing harm
with its armed forces. Yet very few insurgent groups in today’s world – <strong>and</strong> nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>
insurgents in Afghanistan nor those in Iraq – would attempt a degree of symmetry by
raising armed forces with which <strong>the</strong>y hope to compete in decisive battles against <strong>the</strong>
state’s own forces. Instead <strong>the</strong>y deliberately employ guerrilla “hunt <strong>and</strong> pounce” tactics
involving very few of <strong>the</strong> bases, barracks, warehouses, armoured vehicles <strong>and</strong> heavy
weapons that traditionally form <strong>the</strong> target sets of many denial air campaigns.
It is <strong>the</strong> same even with old-fashioned punishment strikes which ordinarily occur
retributively when both coercion <strong>and</strong> denial campaigns have failed. Designing target sets
to punish insurgent groups successfully for <strong>the</strong>ir maleficence is almost impossible. The
insurgents rely on local populations for many of <strong>the</strong>ir material needs <strong>and</strong> do so in such
discreet ways that finding valuable targets belonging only to <strong>the</strong> culpable within <strong>the</strong> local
civilian communities is virtually unachievable.
A lack of viable independent “strategic” roles in most counter-insurgency contexts does not
mean that air power is of minimal importance or influence against insurgents. Traditional
“tactical” air power still plays a key role. This usually comprises air-l<strong>and</strong> integration
(although some air forces do also operate closely with maritime forces). The two key
roles of air-l<strong>and</strong> integration are close air support <strong>and</strong> interdiction <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>y ordinarily
prove highly effective during conventional warfare. Yet <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>and</strong> physical settings
of modern insurgencies makes <strong>the</strong>se two roles ra<strong>the</strong>r difficult. At <strong>the</strong> heart of close air
support doctrine for conventional warfighting lies <strong>the</strong> issue of fire-support co-ordination;
that is, <strong>the</strong> synchronisation of <strong>the</strong> use of weaponry, or “fires,” from above with <strong>the</strong> fires
provided by l<strong>and</strong> forces. This is normally rendered possible by <strong>the</strong> establishment of fire
support co-ordination lines. These are agreed positions lying between <strong>the</strong> forward lines
of one’s own troops <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> forward lines of <strong>the</strong> enemy’s troops. They exist to minimise
fratricide <strong>and</strong> to maximise <strong>the</strong> impact of joint fires during contact battles. In modern
insurgencies <strong>the</strong>re are seldom any lines of troops, friendly or enemy. Fighting smartly to
compensate for <strong>the</strong>ir disadvantages <strong>and</strong> limitations, <strong>the</strong> insurgents intentionally fight in
14
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”