Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong> <strong>and</strong> Counter-insurgency: Back to <strong>the</strong> Basics
For <strong>the</strong> last couple of years <strong>the</strong> US Army Comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> General Staff College has been
dealing with <strong>the</strong> issue of effective leadership in counter-insurgency <strong>and</strong> have decided
that officers need cultural expertise. The model of leadership held up in <strong>the</strong> Staff college
course instruction is T E Lawrence, more popularly known as “Lawrence of Arabia.” Staff
College students study how Lawrence used his deep knowledge of <strong>the</strong> Arab language
<strong>and</strong> culture to move Arab leaders in <strong>the</strong> direction that he, <strong>and</strong> sometimes <strong>the</strong> British
government, wanted.
This is a case in which I believe that <strong>the</strong> US Army, for all its enthusiasm <strong>and</strong> good intentions,
has got it wrong. First of all, one should ask if <strong>the</strong> T E Lawrence model is appropriate for
<strong>the</strong> average US Army officer. After all, Lawrence was a multi-lingual, psychopathic genius
who pushed his own version of a gr<strong>and</strong> strategic agenda in a <strong>the</strong>atre of war. I suspect that
one Lawrence in a <strong>the</strong>atre of war was more than enough. In any case, Lawrence’s act is a
hard one to follow, <strong>and</strong> it might not be reasonable for <strong>the</strong> US Army to expect its field grade
officers to be cultural experts on <strong>the</strong> level of Lawrence.
To be successful in counter-insurgency, <strong>the</strong> senior military officer does not need to be
a genius, or even a cultural expert. What <strong>the</strong> effective leader needs is what airmen call
“situational awareness.” For a senior officer in counter-insurgency, <strong>the</strong> specific requirement
is political situational awareness; a thorough underst<strong>and</strong>ing of <strong>the</strong> political context of <strong>the</strong>
insurgency. This requires an underst<strong>and</strong>ing of <strong>the</strong> different factions, <strong>the</strong>ir motivations,
<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir goals. It requires an underst<strong>and</strong>ing of <strong>the</strong> fundamental issues of <strong>the</strong> insurgency,
as well as being able to look for realistic political solutions. A senior leader in counterinsurgency
needs to recognise <strong>the</strong> political dimension of his policies <strong>and</strong> carefully employ
<strong>the</strong> resources available to fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> political objectives.
A good example of effective senior leadership in counter-insurgency is General Gerald
Templer, who served as military comm<strong>and</strong>er <strong>and</strong> governor general of Malaya at <strong>the</strong> height
of <strong>the</strong> insurgency, from early 1952 to 1955. Templer inherited a bad situation. When he
took comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> insurgency had been going for four years <strong>and</strong> was steadily increasing
in <strong>the</strong> level of violence. Although <strong>the</strong> British <strong>and</strong> Malay forces had killed many insurgents,
<strong>the</strong> insurgent strength was steadily increasing. Templer’s leadership over three years was
a key element in turning <strong>the</strong> situation around, <strong>and</strong> his approach to counter-insurgency is
worthy of study.
Gerald Templer was a highly intelligent officer, but no genius. He had an outst<strong>and</strong>ing
record as a conventional soldier, having comm<strong>and</strong>ed a division <strong>and</strong> later a corps during
World War II. Yet his success as leader in Malaya was lees a function of his conventional
war skills than an intrinsic talent to study a situation <strong>and</strong> grasp its essentials. Templer
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”