Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Techniques <strong>and</strong> Gadgets, Hearts <strong>and</strong> Minds: An Analysis of Operation Ranch H<strong>and</strong>
Counter-insurgency efforts dem<strong>and</strong> a fifth question: will <strong>the</strong> campaign undermine <strong>the</strong>
efforts to win <strong>the</strong> allegiance of <strong>the</strong> local population? Although Pape generalises from <strong>the</strong>
failed bombing campaigns in Vietnam to make assertions about air power in counterinsurgency,
he does not specifically address <strong>the</strong> role of civilians in counter-insurgency.
Since <strong>the</strong> campaigns he discusses targeted North Vietnam, this omission is underst<strong>and</strong>able.
However, it weakens his analysis of air power in counter-insurgency efforts. Pape’s idea of
using air power for “perfect interdiction” was not possible in Vietnam; “steady pressure at
<strong>the</strong> highest sustainable level to grind down <strong>the</strong> enemy’s military capacity” would adversely
affect <strong>the</strong> local populace as well, a grave error in counter-insurgency. 274
Coercion of <strong>the</strong>
populace in counter-insurgency may lead to <strong>the</strong> creation of more insurgents, or at <strong>the</strong> very
least a population reluctant to take sides at all. Should ei<strong>the</strong>r of <strong>the</strong>se happen, a counterinsurgency
effort is at an enormous disadvantage.
The planning for Ranch H<strong>and</strong> was congruent with Pape’s discussion of mechanisms,
“by which <strong>the</strong> destruction of a target set is supposed to translate into changed enemy
behaviors.” The administration’s <strong>the</strong>ory was that if <strong>the</strong> NLF’s ground cover <strong>and</strong> food
supplies were sufficiently reduced, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> result would be operational paralysis, leading
to <strong>the</strong> desired outcome: that <strong>the</strong> North Vietnamese leave South Vietnam. 275
This confidence proved to be unwarranted. Only after <strong>the</strong> NLF changed <strong>the</strong>ir strategy from
guerrilla fighting to conventional warfare did strategic bombing significantly help <strong>the</strong> US
war effort. 276 That operation, Linebacker, attacked targets in North Vietnam, which Ranch
H<strong>and</strong> did not. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, Linebacker’s targets (for example, power plants <strong>and</strong> shipyards)
were much more closely matched with what <strong>the</strong> NLF needed to wage a conventional
campaign. Pape’s analysis is more relevant to <strong>the</strong>se circumstances. “The critical leverage in
conventional coercion comes from exploiting <strong>the</strong> vulnerabilities in <strong>the</strong> opponent’s military
strategy, not from threats or costs to civilians.” 277
Schelling places more importance on <strong>the</strong> local population than does Pape. He describes
<strong>the</strong> differences between Vietnam <strong>and</strong> conventional war bluntly. “Vietnam in <strong>the</strong> early
1960s was less like a war between two avowed opponents than like gang warfare with
two competing gangs selling ‘protection’ to <strong>the</strong> population.” 278 In Schelling’s analysis of
blockades, he observes that:
It has never been quite clear whe<strong>the</strong>r blockade…was expected to
make war unendurable for <strong>the</strong> people or just to weaken <strong>the</strong> enemy
forces by denying economic support…. <strong>the</strong>re was no need to be
clear about <strong>the</strong> purpose as long as ei<strong>the</strong>r purpose was regarded as
legitimate <strong>and</strong> ei<strong>the</strong>r might be served. 279
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”