Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

Chapter 11
retaining, <strong>and</strong> exploiting <strong>the</strong> initiative. This active imposition of l<strong>and</strong>
power makes <strong>the</strong> offense <strong>the</strong> decisive type of military operation,
whe<strong>the</strong>r undertaken against irregular forces or <strong>the</strong> armed forces
of a nation state. In addition, <strong>the</strong> physical presence of l<strong>and</strong> forces
<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir credible ability to conduct offensive operations enable <strong>the</strong>
unimpeded conduct of stability <strong>and</strong> reconstruction operations.
This is a paraphrase from On War without <strong>the</strong> now politically-incorrect references to
violence <strong>and</strong> slaughter so prevalent in Clausewitz’s writings. In US Army Field Manual
3-0, “Operations,” this belief in <strong>the</strong> necessity <strong>and</strong> desirability of close combat is reiterated:
L<strong>and</strong> combat continues to be <strong>the</strong> salient feature of conflict. It
usually involves destroying or defeating enemy forces or taking l<strong>and</strong>
objectives that reduce <strong>the</strong> enemy’s effectiveness or will to fight.
The US Marine Corps has a similar view of war, although <strong>the</strong>y seldom find <strong>the</strong> need to be
politically correct. In <strong>the</strong>ir Fleet Marine Field Manual 1, “Warfighting,” <strong>the</strong>y too paraphrase
On War to educate <strong>the</strong>ir troops on <strong>the</strong> nature of war: 462
The means of war is force, applied in <strong>the</strong> form of organized violence.
It is through <strong>the</strong> use of violence – or <strong>the</strong> credible threat of violence,
which requires <strong>the</strong> apparent willingness to use it – that we compel our
enemy to do our will. In ei<strong>the</strong>r event, violence is an essential element of
war, <strong>and</strong> its immediate result is bloodshed, destruction <strong>and</strong> suffering.
While <strong>the</strong> magnitude of violence may vary with <strong>the</strong> object <strong>and</strong> means
of war, <strong>the</strong> violent essence of war will never change. Any study of war
that neglects this characteristic is misleading <strong>and</strong> incomplete.
In my view, such slavish devotion to <strong>the</strong> anachronistic teachings of Clausewitz has, as
noted in <strong>the</strong> first part of my chapter, led us into a world of trouble.
Jomini is ano<strong>the</strong>r matter. In many ways he has been even more influential, albeit
somewhat unknowingly, in <strong>the</strong> training <strong>and</strong> education of military officers in <strong>the</strong> west
than has Clausewitz. With a methodology <strong>and</strong> approach that military academics have
loved to scorn ever since, Jomini wrote what he believed were practical guidelines for <strong>the</strong>
conduct of war. To many, this smacked of trying to make war a science ra<strong>the</strong>r than an art.
They have seen <strong>the</strong>m as simplistic; yet <strong>the</strong> enduring drive to simplify <strong>the</strong> practice of war
with “principles” testifies to <strong>the</strong> need for just such formulations. In 1807 Jomini listed ten
maxims, simplified here: 463
<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror” 189