Air Power, Insurgency and the “War on Terror” - Prof. Joel Hayward's ...

<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”
493. William Arkin, Damian Durrant <strong>and</strong> Marianne Cherni, On Impact: Modern Warfare
<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Environment, a Case Study of <strong>the</strong> Gulf War (London: Greenpeace
International, May 1991), p. 46; John G Heidenrich, “The Gulf War: How Many
Iraqis Died?” Foreign Policy, 90, Spring 1993, pp. 108-25. Arkin also notes (p 15)
that at least 50,000 Kurds <strong>and</strong> Shiites were killed by Saddam in <strong>the</strong> abortive
uprisings of summer 1991.
494. Robert C Owen, ed., Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective <strong>Air</strong> Campaigning
(Maxwell AFB: <strong>Air</strong> University Press, 2000), p. 161. For Kosovo, see Civilian Deaths
in <strong>the</strong> NATO <strong>Air</strong> Campaign (New York: Human Rights Watch, February 2000), p. 5.
495. J F C Fuller, The Foundations of <strong>the</strong> Science of War (London: Hutchinson, 1926),
Chapter X.
496. Aamer Madhani, “Army’s Credibility Takes 2 Hard Hits,” Chicago Tribune,
25 April 2007, pp. 1, 20.
497. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military <strong>and</strong> Associated
Terms, August 2006. Definition: The strategic level of war: The level of war at which
a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or
multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives <strong>and</strong> guidance, <strong>and</strong>
develops <strong>and</strong> uses national resources to achieve <strong>the</strong>se objectives. Activities at this
level establish national <strong>and</strong> multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives;
fine limits <strong>and</strong> assess risks for <strong>the</strong> use of military <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r instruments of national
power; develop global plans or <strong>the</strong>atre war plans to achieve those objectives; <strong>and</strong>
provide military forces <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r capabilities in accordance with strategic plans.
498. FM 3-24 Counter-insurgency (December 2006).
499. See James S Corum, “Building <strong>the</strong> Malayan Army <strong>and</strong> Police: Britain’s Experience
During <strong>the</strong> Malayan Emergency 1948-1960,” Security Assistance: US <strong>and</strong>
International Historical Perspectives, ed. R<strong>and</strong>all Gott Leavenworth: Combat Studies
Institute Press, 2006) pp. 291-314.
500. Good overviews of Britain’s relationship with Cyprus <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> origins of <strong>the</strong>
insurgency are found in Robert Holl<strong>and</strong>, Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Revolt in Cyprus 1954-1959
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). For a good general history of <strong>the</strong> insurgency see
Nancy Cranshaw, The Cyprus Revolt (London: Allen <strong>and</strong> Unwin, 1978) <strong>and</strong> Charles
Foley <strong>and</strong> W I Scobie, The Struggle for Cyprus (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press,
1975).
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<strong>Air</strong> <strong>Power</strong>, <strong>Insurgency</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “War on Terror”