DHL Global Connectedness Index 2014
DHL Global Connectedness Index 2014
DHL Global Connectedness Index 2014
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<strong>DHL</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Connectedness</strong> <strong>Index</strong> <strong>2014</strong><br />
13<br />
Defining <strong>Global</strong>ization<br />
<strong>Global</strong>ization is a widely-used term but different<br />
people mean different things by it. Probably the<br />
most widely-cited definition is due to David Held et<br />
al., who conceive of globalization as a “transformation<br />
in the spatial organization of social relations<br />
and transactions—assessed in terms of their extensity,<br />
intensity, velocity and impact—generating transcontinental<br />
or interregional flows…” 11 —and insist<br />
that a satisfactory definition must capture each of<br />
these four elements. The definition of globalization<br />
in the <strong>DHL</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Connectedness</strong> <strong>Index</strong> (GCI) follows<br />
this theoretical definition in some respects but<br />
departs from it in others.<br />
The GCI’s focus on depth coincides with what Held<br />
et al. refer to as intensity. And its focus on breadth,<br />
or more broadly distribution, resembles what they<br />
refer to as extensity, but with a difference. Our<br />
analysis reveals that, on average, more than half<br />
of international flows and stocks measured in the<br />
GCI take place within rather than between regions.<br />
While Held et al. suggest excluding such flows, doing<br />
so within, say, Europe (where the intra-regional<br />
average is 69%), 12 would yield a severely incomplete<br />
picture of countries’ international interactions.<br />
Velocity, as defined by Held et al., is largely a result<br />
of developments in transportation and communication<br />
technologies. We exclude it from the GCI<br />
because it does not exhibit sufficient variation over<br />
the time frame we analyze—since 2005—or, given<br />
limitations in data availability, across countries. In<br />
terms of communications technologies, time lags<br />
seem to have asymptoted towards zero a long time<br />
ago. Thus, the transatlantic telegraph cable reduced<br />
the time that it took for information to travel from<br />
New York to London from three weeks to a few<br />
hours in the 1860s, and to one minute by 1914. 13<br />
The fourth element highlighted by Held et al., the<br />
impact of globalization, is crucially important, but—<br />
in our view—should not be mixed up with measures<br />
of globalization itself. In order to analyze the links<br />
between globalization and other phenomena of<br />
interest, we must have separate measures of them.<br />
That is why GCI scores and ranks focus exclusively<br />
on measures of actual international interactions that<br />
take place between countries. They exclude—unlike<br />
some other globalization indexes—the effects of<br />
globalization as well as its enablers.<br />
Finally, the perspective on globalization underlying<br />
the GCI also calls attention to directionality, which is<br />
missing from Held et al.’s definition even though it<br />
seems both theoretically and empirically important.<br />
Inbound versus outbound flows may be qualitatively<br />
different in their significance. Think, for example,<br />
about many countries’ focus on mercantilist trade<br />
policies that favor exports over imports. And empirically,<br />
the other flows and stocks measured in the<br />
GCI are (even) more unbalanced than merchandise<br />
trade—and in most instances, imbalances have increased<br />
rather than decreased since 2005.<br />
In summary, the definition of globalization underlying<br />
the GCI builds on but also adapts and, in some<br />
respects, goes beyond previous definitions of globalization.<br />
brought back into the discussion in the final section. Let’s<br />
start with the collection of global depth measures presented<br />
in Figure 1.1. It turns out that the international<br />
proportion of these activities—which can take place either<br />
domestically or internationally—represents a small fraction<br />
of the total, typically less than 20% and often less than 10%.<br />
For only two of the variables—trade and portfolio equity<br />
stocks—do internationalization levels exceed 30%—and<br />
one of them (trade) is inflated by double-counting when<br />
products cross borders multiple times during their production<br />
processes. Removing such double counting brings the<br />
share of value added around the world that gets exported<br />
down from 32% to about 23%. And while the value of international<br />
portfolio equity stocks has reached 39% of stock<br />
market capitalization, research still indicates a very high<br />
level of home bias in investors’ portfolios.<br />
These levels of globalization are much lower than the levels<br />
one would expect to see if borders and distance had ceased<br />
to matter (which would typically imply values of 85% or<br />
more). They are also significantly lower than most people’s<br />
intuitions. In an online survey conducted by the Harvard<br />
Business Review, respondents pegged international phone<br />
calls at 29% of the total, immigrants at 22% of the world’s<br />
population, and foreign direct investment (FDI) at 32% of<br />
total fixed capital formation—an average estimate of 27%,<br />
or more than five times the actual average. 14 (CEOs, interestingly<br />
enough, overestimated by a factor of nearly seven!)