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DHL Global Connectedness Index 2014

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<strong>DHL</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Connectedness</strong> <strong>Index</strong> <strong>2014</strong><br />

13<br />

Defining <strong>Global</strong>ization<br />

<strong>Global</strong>ization is a widely-used term but different<br />

people mean different things by it. Probably the<br />

most widely-cited definition is due to David Held et<br />

al., who conceive of globalization as a “transformation<br />

in the spatial organization of social relations<br />

and transactions—assessed in terms of their extensity,<br />

intensity, velocity and impact—generating transcontinental<br />

or interregional flows…” 11 —and insist<br />

that a satisfactory definition must capture each of<br />

these four elements. The definition of globalization<br />

in the <strong>DHL</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Connectedness</strong> <strong>Index</strong> (GCI) follows<br />

this theoretical definition in some respects but<br />

departs from it in others.<br />

The GCI’s focus on depth coincides with what Held<br />

et al. refer to as intensity. And its focus on breadth,<br />

or more broadly distribution, resembles what they<br />

refer to as extensity, but with a difference. Our<br />

analysis reveals that, on average, more than half<br />

of international flows and stocks measured in the<br />

GCI take place within rather than between regions.<br />

While Held et al. suggest excluding such flows, doing<br />

so within, say, Europe (where the intra-regional<br />

average is 69%), 12 would yield a severely incomplete<br />

picture of countries’ international interactions.<br />

Velocity, as defined by Held et al., is largely a result<br />

of developments in transportation and communication<br />

technologies. We exclude it from the GCI<br />

because it does not exhibit sufficient variation over<br />

the time frame we analyze—since 2005—or, given<br />

limitations in data availability, across countries. In<br />

terms of communications technologies, time lags<br />

seem to have asymptoted towards zero a long time<br />

ago. Thus, the transatlantic telegraph cable reduced<br />

the time that it took for information to travel from<br />

New York to London from three weeks to a few<br />

hours in the 1860s, and to one minute by 1914. 13<br />

The fourth element highlighted by Held et al., the<br />

impact of globalization, is crucially important, but—<br />

in our view—should not be mixed up with measures<br />

of globalization itself. In order to analyze the links<br />

between globalization and other phenomena of<br />

interest, we must have separate measures of them.<br />

That is why GCI scores and ranks focus exclusively<br />

on measures of actual international interactions that<br />

take place between countries. They exclude—unlike<br />

some other globalization indexes—the effects of<br />

globalization as well as its enablers.<br />

Finally, the perspective on globalization underlying<br />

the GCI also calls attention to directionality, which is<br />

missing from Held et al.’s definition even though it<br />

seems both theoretically and empirically important.<br />

Inbound versus outbound flows may be qualitatively<br />

different in their significance. Think, for example,<br />

about many countries’ focus on mercantilist trade<br />

policies that favor exports over imports. And empirically,<br />

the other flows and stocks measured in the<br />

GCI are (even) more unbalanced than merchandise<br />

trade—and in most instances, imbalances have increased<br />

rather than decreased since 2005.<br />

In summary, the definition of globalization underlying<br />

the GCI builds on but also adapts and, in some<br />

respects, goes beyond previous definitions of globalization.<br />

brought back into the discussion in the final section. Let’s<br />

start with the collection of global depth measures presented<br />

in Figure 1.1. It turns out that the international<br />

proportion of these activities—which can take place either<br />

domestically or internationally—represents a small fraction<br />

of the total, typically less than 20% and often less than 10%.<br />

For only two of the variables—trade and portfolio equity<br />

stocks—do internationalization levels exceed 30%—and<br />

one of them (trade) is inflated by double-counting when<br />

products cross borders multiple times during their production<br />

processes. Removing such double counting brings the<br />

share of value added around the world that gets exported<br />

down from 32% to about 23%. And while the value of international<br />

portfolio equity stocks has reached 39% of stock<br />

market capitalization, research still indicates a very high<br />

level of home bias in investors’ portfolios.<br />

These levels of globalization are much lower than the levels<br />

one would expect to see if borders and distance had ceased<br />

to matter (which would typically imply values of 85% or<br />

more). They are also significantly lower than most people’s<br />

intuitions. In an online survey conducted by the Harvard<br />

Business Review, respondents pegged international phone<br />

calls at 29% of the total, immigrants at 22% of the world’s<br />

population, and foreign direct investment (FDI) at 32% of<br />

total fixed capital formation—an average estimate of 27%,<br />

or more than five times the actual average. 14 (CEOs, interestingly<br />

enough, overestimated by a factor of nearly seven!)

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