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attacks require the adversary to manipulate a large number of votes and therefore it is likely to detect at least a fraction of the manipulations. The approach does not provide integrity of the real vote itself but strongly indicates possible manipulations by analyzing the proper handling of the test ballots. To detect manipulations in the context of the Secure Platform Problem, the test ballots must be individually verifiable by the user. Hence, the test ballots are exposed after the election’s vote casting phase and the adversary learns the real ballot. 6. TRUSTED DEVICES In the context of e-banking, a variety of technical solutions for user and transaction authentication have been presented and even deployed on a large scale. In the following we will analyze these approaches regarding the security criteria that we defined and give some hints on how such approaches could be adapted to internet voting. Solutions based on trusted devices can be classified into standalone approaches, where the trusted device (TD) is not attached to the user’s untrusted platform, and connected approaches, where the trusted device is connected to the adversary, for example, to the user’s platform. The term trusted indicates that users must trust the devices to offer trustworthy functionalities and that they securely store confidential data. If the device additionally stores a specific user’s secret information, such as cryptographic keys, we call the device a personal trusted device (PTD). Examples of personal trusted devices are smart cards. They can perform certain cryptographic operations and store individual secret information, i.e., the user’s secret key. Since additional devices are required to access the smart cards, users need to trust these devices too. Hence, in smart card based approaches the card readers are also part of the trusted device. In our model, the trust-base is the user’s smart card including the reader that is used to access the card. 6.1 Standalone Trusted Devices Standalone trusted devices could be seen as calculators. The user communicates directly with the device and no communication takes place between the trusted device and any other party than the user. Challenge-response authentication protocols for e-banking solutions that use a smart card reader with a pin pad and a display are an example for this category of approaches. The bank first sends a challenge code through the user’s untrusted platform to the user who in turn enters this code into the card reader together with the bankcard’s PIN (personal identification number) for accessing the card. The card then computes a MAC (message authentication code) 4 of the challenge code and secret information stored on the card. This MAC is displayed to the user through the reader’s display. Finally, the user enters the MAC into the untrusted platform and submits it back to the bank. If the response code corresponds to a valid MAC, the bank is convinced that the correct card (containing the secret information) as well as a person who knows the correct PIN to access the card are involved in the protocol run. 4 Other cryptographic operations can be used and in practice, asymmetric cryptography is often applied, where the challenge code is signed using the secret key stored on the card. 415 To adapt this approach to internet voting, such a device could be used to encrypt and authenticate the ballot. The user enters the candidate choice directly into the PTD and gets back an encrypted ballot, for example, represented as an alphanumeric code. The user enters the encrypted ballot into her untrusted platform and submits it to the server. Such an approach can be used to provide “digital” code voting without a separated out-of-band channel. The initial vote codes are digitally provided to the users via their untrusted platforms. The vote codes are then used like the challenges in the above described challenge-response authentication example. The user enters the MAC of a secret key and the vote code that corresponds to her choice into the untrusted platform to submit this vote to the server. The authority in possession of the same secret key computes the MACs for all candidate codes and compares them with the received MAC to derive the user’s choice. Furthermore, the server could again compute the MAC of the received MAC and send it back to the user as a confirmation code that can be verified by the user when again performing the same operation using the PTD. In practice a more sophisticated scheme is required to prevent the authority from learning individual users’ votes. Since no clear-text referring to a user’s choice is submitted to the adversary, the approach supports user-to-server-secrecy. The other way round the user can use the trust-base to decrypt messages encrypted by the server. The setting provides user-to-serverintegrity if combined with a verifiable confirmation code as described above. However, user-friendliness is questionable since the user must relay all encrypted communication between the trust-base and the server. In the case of a few short codes, this may be applicable but not necessarily in complex elections where the user must choose multiple candidates. 6.2 Connected Trusted Devices In contrast to standalone TDs, connected TDs are attached to the adversary, in most cases to the user’s untrusted platform, thus there is a communication channel between the adversary and the trust-base. Simple approaches offer specific functionalities to the platform they are attached to such as securely storing secret information. More sophisticated networked devices are able to directly communicate with the remote server. Generally, the more functionalities a TD offers, the more vulnerabilities may occur. However, in our model we limited the adversary’s capabilities by assuming that the adversary cannot manipulate the trust-base. The communication interfaces of a connected TD directly affect the possible security guarantees of any protocol making use of it. To make this clear, we will summarize the possible communication capabilities of the trust-base, provide examples, and discuss the properties of each setting. 6.2.1 No Communication Between User and Trust- Base The trust-base has no interface to communicate with the user and all communication is based on the untrusted platform (which is part of the adversary). Particularly the user can only communicate with the adversary and neither secrecy nor integrity can be achieved with respect to our model. The only guarantee in this setting is that during the protocol run, the TD is attached to a computer, which is reachable by the adversary.
Widely deployed examples for this setting are smart cards in combination with class 1 card readers directly attached to the platform via USB. Unfortunately, the adversary immediately learns every message sent by the user, particularly the PIN that protects access to the card. Hence, after the first time the user enters the PIN, the adversary may arbitrarily use the card and perform whatever cryptographic operation the smart card offers, as long as it is attached to the untrusted platform. Applying this to internet voting the user does not know what is being processed by the TD and in a setting where vote updating is allowed, the user does not even notice that the smart card is being used at a later time to replace a vote. Another example are hardware tokens like the mIDentity developed by Kobil [17] for e-banking and other sensitive applications where a browser runs in a “secure” environment on the TD. However, as there is no communication between the trust-base and the user none of the defined security properties are guaranteed with respect to our model. 6.2.2 Unidirectional Communication from the User to the Trust-Base The TD provides an input interface to the user such as a pin pad and the user can send clear-text messages to the TD, which are encrypted afterwards. Hence, such approaches provide user-toserver-secrecy as well as user-to-server-integrity. Depending on the protocol, the user can even verify the correct reception of the message (individual verifiability). To do so, the user enters her choice together with a random number into the TD, which in turn encrypts these messages with a secret key as well as a hash value thereof. The secret key is shared between the server and the TD. The TD sends the encrypted values to the adversary for submitting them to the server. After reception, the server first decrypts them and verifies their integrity before sending the random number back to the adversary as confirmation. The adversary provides this confirmation to the user and the user is convinced that the server received the correct message if and only if the confirmation corresponds to the previously entered random number. Since the adversary cannot break cryptography, the best strategy would be to guess the random number, which is not feasible for large enough numbers. In this setting the server cannot send any secret or authentic message to the user because the TD is not able to communicate with the user differently than through the adversary. Examples include smart cards in combination with class 2 readers. These readers provide a pin pad to prevent the platform from learning the PIN since it is directly entered into the trusted card reader. Because the adversary does not learn the PIN, unnoticed access to the smart card’s functionality is prevented. 6.2.3 Unidirectional Communication from the Trust- Base to the User The TD has an output interface such as a display or a speaker. The adversary learns every message sent by the user. Therefore A can learn every message sent by the user and again the adversary may learn the PIN to access TD’s functionality. It is possible to avoid this, for example, by displaying a randomly permuted pin pad on the untrusted platform’s display on which the user has to enter the PIN [4]. The corresponding permutation is displayed on the TD’s display. Every time the TD is accessed it challenges the user, using the output interface. Moreover, the TD’s output interface can be used to verify that the server received the correct message. To do so, the server sends confirmation messages, which the trust- 416 base is able to decrypt and verify. The verification result is then provided to the user. Hence, depending on the concrete implementation, secrecy and integrity from the user to the server as well as vice versa can be achieved. Thus, it overcomes the Secure Platform Problem but requires sophisticated user interfaces to assure secrecy and therefore lacks user-friendliness for practical applications. User-to-server-integrity can conveniently be achieved by individual verifiability. More specifically, the PTD’s trustworthy output interface can be used to verify information received by the server. Examples are smart cards and readers with only a confirmation display. The display can be used to verify data that will be processed by the smart card. Another example. Which is already widely applied in e-banking is transaction authentication. Confirmation information of every transaction entered by the user is sent over a dedicated channel to the user. The user verifies the correctness and authorizes the transaction. One concrete implementation is based on short messages and mobile phones as TDs. The user enters the desired transaction into the untrusted platform and sends it to the bank’s server. The server generates a transaction authentication number (TAN) and sends a short message containing the beneficiary’s account number, the amount, and the TAN to the user’s mobile phone. Now, the user verifies the correctness of the transaction information. If verification is successful, the user authorizes the transaction by entering the TAN into the untrusted platform to send it to the server. The server compares the received TAN with the expected TAN and accepts the transaction if they are equal. This concept could be used for internet voting to allow individual verification but it is only secure as long as the adversary cannot break confidentiality and integrity of the short messages sent by the authority’s server. Unfortunately today’s implementations cannot prevent either. Moreover, it is questionable whether it is reasonable to assume mobile phones to be trustworthy. In near future communication platforms may conflate and voting as well as short messaging may be performed using the same platform, which introduces the Secure Platform Problem again. 6.2.4 Bidirectional Communication between the Trust-Base and the User The trust-base provides an input as well as an output interface to communicate with the user. In this setting the user may enter confidential messages directly into the TD. In contrast to the setting where communication exclusively takes place from the TD to the user, user-friendliness is improved because of the fact, that security-critical messages can directly be entered, thereby conveniently enabling user-to-server-secrecy. User-to-serverintegrity is based on the ability of the TD to encrypt (and sign) messages. This setting also allows individual verifiability based on the TD’s trustworthy output interface to the user. Examples are smart cards in combination with class 3 readers. These devices offer a high degree of security and a convenient way for the user to securely communicate with the trusted server. More complex solutions allow the TD to directly communicate with the server using standard network communication protocols. The Zone Trusted Information Channel (ZTIC) [2][34] was recently developed by IBM and is widely deployed by a popular Swiss bank. The ZTIC is a networked USB-attached smart card reader for application and transaction authentication in e-banking. The device consists of a small display and a few buttons. Trans-
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2012 ALBANY, NEW YORK UNITED STATES
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Foreword The 6 th International Con
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Table of Contents Forward .........
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Session 10: ICTs & Governance Trans
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o Revival of Farming Community with
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International Steering Committee Jo
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Jim DAVIES, Computing Laboratory, U
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Session 1 Open Government Data
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the combination of their moral sent
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involve the creation of a Network o
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approach [28] to expose indicators
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4. IMPLENTING PAR In order to come
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conclusions that might arise rom th
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6.3 Large Scale Implementation In r
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Implementation Framework for Open D
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2) Usage: Assessed by quantifying t
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Increasing Kenyan Open Data Consump
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insight into available data resourc
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New Perspectives for Electronic Gov
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Not without reason therefore that t
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Another principle adopted by this s
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access to public information, chang
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Open Government 2.0: Citizen Empowe
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As a third finding, we also found a
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Session 2 E-democracy & Participati
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two polarized (optimistic or utopia
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through aggregating, shaping, and c
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in-depth expert interviews, and wer
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government made of citizens’ cont
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[8] Putman, R.D. 1994. Making Democ
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The third stream of studies reviewe
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interests, gaining access to inform
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2. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 2.1 The P
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epresentatives from the three main
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While letters to the editor could b
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person. Table 5: Public sphere char
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[32] Yang, S., H. Lee, and S. Kurni
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In March 2000, just a couple of mon
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society the gap will close [2]. The
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A New Roadmap for Next-Generation P
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needs and the activities of policy-
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[18] Moss, S., (2010). Policy Model
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2.1. National digital inclusion exp
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advanced initiatives specifically d
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involved later [22]. Several instit
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among lecturers and students parall
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2. COMPARATIVE E-GOVERNMENT IN LATI
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governments can innovate or be disc
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2. E-GOVERNMENT AS IS 2.1. E-Govern
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ankings on the formation of nationa
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Framework for Useful Transparency W
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are doing a good job overall in reg
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The Circular Continuum of Agencies,
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continue to rely on dial-up Interne
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this time the authors continue to w
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government agencies should consider
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The critical success factors for we
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include customers and competitors,
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Websites or columns for MFWs In thi
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According to our investigation, the
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Construction of Inter-regional Publ
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The Development of Public Smart Pho
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Stage Description 1 st stage (Simpl
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Understanding Citizens’ Perceptio
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performance compared to those provi
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Session 5 Information Sharing, Mode
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arising as a result of these two bi
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forms for the system. At the same t
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further investigation of the relati
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5.3.10 Commitment Both personal and
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law. Virginia Journal of Internatio
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available to others” [5]. Informa
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conflict around information sharing
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for understanding information polic
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primarily on the information flows
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On Public Service Provision Informa
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employs workflow management technol
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o Information. Represents any infor
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common documents repository at the
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Figure 15. Full model of Passport I
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142
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policies to prevent government agen
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ecause the majority of the shared i
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A Patent System Ontology for Facili
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uilt on top of the semantics of RDF
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dynamically derive relevancy based
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Figure 6. Cross-‐Reference betw
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Category II: After identifying some
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[8] De Nicola, A., Missikoff, M. an
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oral option, it also allows for a m
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mapping of citizens would ensure un
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Here the authors wish to extend the
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http://www.ecp.gov.pk/Reports/SPStr
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will enable to assess and confront
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The underlying DeLP process is as f
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Preparing for Digital Curation Gove
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semester hours. Nine of the forty-f
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REGNET: Regulatory Information Mana
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Search Terms/ Concepts References D
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4. COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF REGULATOR
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1105.4 [6] Content of Section 1105.
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Pollution Prevention Guide for Vehi
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From Information-Poor to Informatio
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To address the divide, specific gov
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ICT for Development and the MuNet P
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competencies and skills, contributi
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ICT Policy in Africa - A Comparativ
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essential and necessary to guide th
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Kenya it is the minister for Inform
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of existing Public Internet Access
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the policy process e.g. formulation
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Laggards or Victims of Socioeconomi
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Figure 3. Facilities & Services Enj
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Promoting user uptake of e-governme
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It was also decided that it was nec
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Session 8 Measurement 1
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technology (IT) projects by governm
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Gap = 5; The weak and unreliable In
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6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT We are grateful
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aspects are hardly discussed as the
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service level agreements. The inter
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concensus of all participants, the
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Furthermore, it is understood from
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Mobile Technologies on the Internet
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of mothers. Based on this reason, w
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5.1.4 Precedence Plots Based on com
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3 indicators are similar but not th
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Latitude 10°�S 9°�S 8°�S 7
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7. CONCLUSION According to ORDIT an
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include but not limited to: payment
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Categories Only XSS (%) Table 2: Di
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From table 3, it can be deduced tha
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Session 9 Social Media in Governmen
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1. What kind of social media servic
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4.2.1 Facebook Usage Figure 3. Perc
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Government Crisis Communication on
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estoration theory. He termed it as
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Table 3. Strategies for Pre-crisis
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accounts, among which seven message
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information in the crisis event sta
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Government Official Microblogs: An
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It is worth mentioning that, while
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Managing Chinese Government Microbl
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due to their tremendous influence,
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3. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This research is
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3) Established year: to specify the
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Figure 6. Language used in Hong Kon
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E-Government and Transformation of
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and domestic as well as internation
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4.6 Computerisation of Railway Tick
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abysmally low (2.25). In addition t
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Evaluating and Assessing a Typology
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Exhaustiveness indicates that all c
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Fig. 1 Spatial Unit Fig. 3. By whom
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SUPPLEMENTARY TABLE 1. RESULT OF SE
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Explaining the eGovernment Paradox:
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eGovernment services to a large ext
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policy agenda, as Heeks [10] says,
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Implementation Plan’s outcomes an
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Conference on eGovernment (pp. 90-9
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Investigating the Relationships bet
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hybrid or authoritarian regime. Bov
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Technologies, Tools and Web 2.0 in
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with resources, peers and experts w
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cluster were: Court Clerks; Court,
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(8 questions) and the third subpart
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http://ux.brookdalecc.edu/governanc
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the examination of the 311 program
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3. CASE STUDY METHOD This study use
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discuss departmental performance at
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or laptop computers. Internet conne
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[2] Anavitarte, L. and Tratz-Ryan,
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A Literature Review: IT Governance
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Interviewees Useful? Table 3. Inter
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Assessment of Success Factors of e-
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In view of different theoretical ap
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approximate figure of 60% of intern
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difference between its priority and
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Computer Supported Contractor Selec
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(2) conduction of the public auctio
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E-Government Success Factors in the
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creating different incentives and p
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American and the Caribbean Institut
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* Note: A 7-points Likert scale was
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showed to be useful, for collecting
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Public CIO, Figurehead or Decision-
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4.2 Operative CIO The Operative CIO
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Session 12 Implementation & Impact
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NYSED is responsible for collecting
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considered markers that are able to
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many of the MDGs. The direct impact
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strongly believed that local govern
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Goal Variables Measurements 2 3 Com
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Hypothesis Variables Endogenous Exo
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[16] Joreskog, K.G., and Sorbom, D.
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GoN has addressed the challenge to
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Figures 6 and 7. Computer classes a
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Page 414 and 415: change their behaviour, improve the
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Page 450 and 451: Reliability of data: data collected
Page 452 and 453: Information System (NHIS). A Nation
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Page 475 and 476: Evolving e-Government Benchmarking
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Page 493 and 494: A strategy of evolution of the mark
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The Metropolitan Area Planning Coun
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expanded functionality in three are
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For each case, semi-structured inte
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Figure 1. Comparative analysis on t
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projects and their on-site images.
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key challenges of Enterprise System
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5. PART THREE: E GOVERNMENT APPLICA
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Following the research objectives,
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From Inter-Agency Information Shari
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479
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more and more valuable with the gro
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Implementation of Integrated Tax Sy
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Information Sharing in Inter-depart
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Interagency Collaboration in Provid
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489
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noted. The list of basic e-services
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the description of procedure for mo
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Opportunities for Improving eGovern
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Prioritization and Geo-Spatiotempor
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[4] R.Bruggemann and Ganapati P. Pa
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equirements. A direct communication
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Stage - 2: Here the actual software
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membership associations, recreation
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Fig 1 : Agriculture Revolution 3. P
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sector, private sector, and civil s
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System For Measuring e-Gov: A Multi
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The Digital Divide’s Devaluing of
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[3] Coursey, D., & Norris, D.F. (20
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In Brazil, electronic accessibility
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2) The areas to which mobile and wi
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2. OVERVIEW OF DISTRICT MAPPING The
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3.4 Driving License Driving License
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and socio-economic backgrounds. The
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Figure - 2: eGovernment Implementat
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Tutorial: Digital Curation for Publ
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ut also provide sufficient detail o
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ABM is known as a bottom-up simulat
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5.2 Relation to Empirics “Where d
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Larson, Elizabeth .................
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