icegov2012 proceedings

society the gap will close [2]. The most intractable issue however
is the lack of privacy and protection the polling place gives to
voters. Some Norwegian politicians have referred to “family
voting” as a reason to abandon Internet voting altogether [11].
In conclusion, it is our opinion that after a decade of
experimentation Internet voting is not ready for large scale
deployment yet. The different experiences presented in this paper
prove the strong desire to devise solutions to the main problems.
End-to-end verifiable ballots represent a key step towards
independence from “absolute” security of every component of the
voting chain. Significant real-world use cases like Estonian
elections help bridging the gap between technology and citizens.
Whether the combination of these two driving forces will be
successful in producing really trustworthy systems, and in
advancing awareness enough for people to properly use them, it is
still very hard to foresee.
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