STF NA MÍDIA

which is owned by the state.
Ghassan Ibrahim, CEO of the
Global Arab Network and a
prominent opponent of the
regime, tells me that the government
permits foreign
companies a share of its booty
only if they can offer
expertise it does not otherwise
possess. As much of the
wealth produced by Syrian
state companies goes into the
pockets of the elite, it seems
clear that if Shell were not
useful to the regime, it would
no longer be there.
Shell says: "We condemn
any violence and the human
rights abuse it represents and
we have deep concern over
the loss of life … we comply
with all applicable international
sanctions." But, though
complying with current sanctions,
it is enriching a government
that is violently
repressing peaceful protest.
The regime has killed some
2,600 Syrian people since
March. Its interrogators have
tortured and mutilated its
prisoners, cutting off genitals
and gouging out eyes.
The likely outcome of Shell s
investment is that Assad has
more money to spend on
soldiers, weapons and prison
cells. The argument for forcing
Shell and other investors
to leave and for finding further
means of starving the
government of money is a
strong one.
But no one with an interest in
human rights can be unaware
of what happened when
western nations applied sanctions
to Syria s neighbour,
Iraq. No one who has seen it
can forget the CBS interview
in 1996 with Madeleine Albright,
Bill Clinton s secretary
of state. The interviewer
pointed out that half a million
children had died in Iraq
as a result of sanctions. "We
think the price is worth it,"
Albright replied. The sanctions
on Iraq could scarcely
have been better designed to
cause mass mortality. But
even measures that are narrower
in scope and applied
more humanely will add economic
distress to the suffering
of Syria s people. Sanctions
broad enough to hurt
the government s ability to
deploy troops will also be
broad enough to hurt the people
they are meant to protect.
And if not sanctions, then
what? So far the only alternatives
on offer are vacuous
condemnation and demands
from the likes of Nick Clegg
that "it s time for Assad to
go", which, in terms of efficacy,
is like being mauled by
a giant sock.
So far the European Union
has imposed travel bans on
members of the regime and
frozen some of their assets.
The impact is likely to be
limited, not least because
Assad and his close associates
are said to have stashed
far greater sums beyond the
reach of the EU (and beyond
the reach of any kind of scrutiny
or accountability) in
Swiss banks. It wasn t until
May that European governments
decided to impose an
arms embargo on Syria, which
tells us more than is comfortable
about their priorities.
But better late than never.
More recently, Europe banned
the import of Syrian oil.
Because the EU imported
over 90% of Syria s oil, because
oil provides 25% of
state revenue and because the
state has a monopoly on its
sale, this would have stung –
had Italy not insisted that the
ban be delayed until mid-
November. This gives the
government time to find new
customers. An investment
ban, which would reduce the
value of assets that enrich the
political elite, could hit the
government much harder.
The obvious means of resolving
this question is to ask
the Syrian people what they
want. But there is no clear
consensus. Of the three opponents
of the Assad regime
I ve consulted, two are in
favour of wide-ranging sanctions,
one is against. Chris
Doyle, director of the Council
for Arab-British Understanding,
who has spoken to a
much larger number of dissidents,
tells me that "Syrians
are hugely divided on this
issue". Almost everyone in
the protest movement supports
sanctions aimed specifically
at members of the
regime and their businesses,
but they are split over wider
measures, such as the EU s
oil embargo.
Ghassan Ibrahim told me that
opponents of the government
recognise that "freedom is
very expensive and you have
to pay the price. Let s pay it
once and for good." He argues
that sanctions are likely
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