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GAP-JOURNAL 2012/13 - AFA

GAP-JOURNAL 2012/13 - AFA

GAP-JOURNAL 2012/13 - AFA

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195<br />

two people. One year later, the same two initiated the drafting ofafriendship treaty that<br />

was signed into force by Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President Vaclav Havel inFebruary<br />

1992 as the Czechoslovak-German Treaty onGood Neighbourhood (Vertrag über<br />

gute Nachbarschaft 1992). The treaty did not only confirm both states adherence to<br />

democracy and the rule of law, as well as peace, security and cooperation, but also<br />

stated that neither of the two countries would claim any territory from the respective<br />

other, respecting the existing borders. Further, economic development and an improvement<br />

of inter-regional relations were promoted and German support for Czechoslovak<br />

accession to the European Union promised. But, the real contentious issues ofcompensation<br />

and the legal status of the Munich treaty was not addressed (Tampke 2003: 144,<br />

145). Whereas the Czechoslovak side claimed that Munich had not been valid from the<br />

beginning, asithad been made without Czechoslovak participation, Germany promoted<br />

the belief that whereas it had been valid, itwas made void byHitler’s subsequent actions.<br />

Both could under nocircumstances accept the other position asitwould have<br />

meant for both toopen the doors toclaims from the other side for compensation and<br />

liability to legal charges. The compromise that was reached used the words nichtig/nullity,<br />

both noofficial legal terms, meaning something like ‘void’ that could be<br />

interpreted from both sides in their respective way (Tampke 2003: <strong>13</strong>4, <strong>13</strong>5, <strong>13</strong>6). Both<br />

sticking to their respective viewpoint, itwas clearly astep towards normalization ofthe<br />

relationship, promoting closer cooperation and outlining common priorities, but it can<br />

hardly be seen as atrue rapprochement as it did not open upadialogue. Different opinions<br />

were only demarcated, not reconciled, making it blatant that there were still profound<br />

differences in the way historical events were interpreted and presented inboth<br />

countries (Gamp 2002: 30, 31).<br />

The Sudeten German organizations again reacted strongly, condemning the treaty and<br />

calling for the abolition ofstill legally valid Benes decrees. They even went asfar as to<br />

pressure the Czechoslovak government by raising the claim that its entry into the European<br />

Union would depend onGerman acceptance hereof and therefore of the Czechoslovaks<br />

giving in to Sudeten German demands. Czechoslovak public opinion reacted<br />

equally negative, especially after the Sudeten German claim, with apoll showing that<br />

by the end of 1995 only around 7%of the Czech citizens would elect aparty that was<br />

planning on apologizing tothe expellees (Tampke 2003: 147, 148).<br />

In an attempt tobuild on the 1992 treaty and to give new impetus to arapprochement of<br />

German-Czech relations after thebreak-up ofthe Czechoslovak Republic into theCzech<br />

Republic and Slovakia, in 1997 a further treaty between Germany and the Czech

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