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US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

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Ten Years of Big Ship Gunnery 75<br />

San Francisco Bay is dangerous.” It also included instructions as to how to<br />

detect dragging of the anchor, who was to carry out this duty, and what to<br />

do if dragging occurred.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Acting Executive Officer, Lieutenant ( jg) Samuel W. Canan in his<br />

accompanying statement stated he had published this order to “All Hands,”<br />

and personally instructed the chief petty officers, signalmen and men standing<br />

gangway watches regarding it, and given copies to each of the officers standing<br />

Day’s Duty. Each of the deck petty o%cers in his statement confirmed<br />

receiving this instruction.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Commanding Officer was not on board “having left at 1120 to attend<br />

the Chamber of Commerce luncheon and not having returned.” Following<br />

the luncheon, he played golf at the Presidio. Ensign Everett H. Browne, Class<br />

of 1923, the Chief Engineer of the Metwine, had the Day’s Duty and was in<br />

command at the time of the casualty.<br />

At 1556 the dragging was noted and immediately reported. Ensign Browne<br />

acted promptly. He sent a messenger ashore for the Commanding Officer.<br />

He heaved around on the port chain, went ahead on the engines at 1616<br />

(as soon as the engines were ready) but “just barely missed clearing the<br />

Colorado.” c’<strong>The</strong> Colorado personnel did everything possible to prevent<br />

damage, veering chain promptly. . . . Especial credit is due the Engineer<br />

Force in starting up the main engines so quickly after being notified.”<br />

Ensign Browne is a very promising young officer, of a high type, zealous,<br />

active and capable, and has already rendered excellent service as Engineer<br />

officer of this vessel, <strong>The</strong> Commanding Officer has confidence in his ability<br />

and judgment. . . . [He] appears to have erred in not dropping the second<br />

anchor as soon as he saw the vessel was dragging.sg<br />

How the seniors in the chain of command viewed this letter is not known<br />

but what is known is that a Board of Investigation was held but as far as<br />

Lieutenant Commander Turner and Ensign Everett Hale Browne were con-<br />

cerned, nothing of a disciplinary nature ever came of it. And that was luck<br />

of the first water.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Board of Investigation of three commanders was headed by the Divi-<br />

sion Commander, Commander <strong>The</strong>odore A. Kittinger, and convened on<br />

13 April 1925. Ensign Browne testified that he “did not think you could<br />

heave in on one anchor and veer on the other at the same time,” with only<br />

the one capstan with which destroyers were fitted. This combined with the<br />

fact that he had noted that “the starboard anchor chain was faked out on<br />

‘“COMervine to CINCIIS, Ie!ter, 8 Apr. 1925.

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