US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

CACTUS Bound 301
several hundred miles south of Guadalcanal. CTF 61 did not buy this
proposal and COMSOPAC later decided it was impractical.3’
One of the participants interviewed labeled the Saratoga conference
“stormy.” Captain Peyton’s (Chief of Staff to COMPHIBFORSOPAC)
recollection of the conference ran as follows:
The conference was one long bitter argument between Vice Admiral
Fletcher and my new boss [Turner]. Fletcher questioned the whole upcoming
operation. Since he kept implying that it was largely Turner’s brainchild,
and mentioning that those who planned it had no real fighting experience,
he seemed to be doubting the competence of its parent.
Fletcher’s main point of view was the operation was too hurriedly and
therefore not thoroughly planned, the Task Force not trained together; and
the logistic support inadequate.
My boss kept saying ‘the decision has been made. It’s up to us to make it a
success.’
I was amazed and disturbed by the way these two admirals taIked to each
other. I had never heard anything like it.
In my opinion too much of the conference was devoted to ‘fighting the
problem,’ as we used to say at the [Naval] War College, and too little time
to trying to solve the problem.’”
A more senior observer and one more used to the sharp give and take
during the councils of the naval great, took a much calmer view of this
conference.
I would calI the mood of the conference animated rather than stormy.
Turner asked for a lot of things, much of which he didn’t get, because they
were not in the realm of the possible.
The sharpest divergence of opinicn was in regard to the length of time the
carriers should be held in an area where they could support the landings.
Fletcher insisted that two days was all that could be risked—because of both
the submarine danger and the risk of Japanese shore based air attack.
Other divergences of opinion related to air search and logistics.
After the conference was over, 1 overheard Turner ask Vandegrift ‘How
did I do?’ Vandegrift’s answer was ‘all right.’ That also was my personal
assessment .41
Vice Admiral Fletcher’s remembrance of the conference was that:
Kelly and I spent most of our time picking on Dan Callaghan because
of the poor logistics situation. . . . Fuel was my main consideration.
Kelly was no shrinking violet, and always spoke his piece in conferences.
W(a) COMSOPAC to CTF 61, 020240 Aug. 1912; (b) COMAIRSOPAC to COMSOPAC,
041436 Aug. 1942; (C) CINCPAC to COMAIRSOPAC, 022115 Aug. 1942.
40Peyton.
“ Interview with Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, USN (Ret.), 20 May 1963. Hereafter Kinkaid.