US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

WATCHTOWER 243
a. the geography and communications of Australia impose serious limitations
on offensive air and ground offensive actions.
b. limitations of tonnage for the long voyage restrict U. S. ground commitments.
c. requirements for U. S. air units in other theatres would seem definitely
to limit for some time to come the extent to which we can provide for a fur-
ther expansion in the Pacific-Australian theater.
In reply to General Marshall’s letter, Admiral King stated that:
The scheme or concept of operations is not only to protect the line of com-
munications with Australia, but, in so doing, set up ‘strong points’ from which
a step-by-step general advance can be made through the New Hebrides,
Solomons, and the Bismarck Archipelago. It is expected that such a step-by-
step general advance will draw Japanese forces to oppose it, thus relieving
pressure in other parts of the Pacific and that the operation will of itself be
good cover for the communications with Australia.” 32
Admiral King then answered each question of the Chief of Staff with his
frankly more offensively minded concepts of our future Pacific endeavors:
When the advance to the northwest begins, it is expected to use amphibious
troops (chiefly from the Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet) to seize and occupy
strong points under the cover of appropriate naval and air forces.
I agree that the time is at hand when we must reach a decision—with the
knowledge of the combined Chiefs of Staff-as to what endeavors the United
States is to make in advance of the general Allied interest.
This difference of opinion at the highest military level led to much ruflling
of feathers at the Joint Planners level. This ruffling was the more apparent
because at the time when this question of essential “land forces required to
hold base areas in the first defensive stage” was being hotly debated at the
Joint Staff planning level, many of the planners who were assigned duty in
both the Combined Staff as well as the Joint Staff were repeating the same
arguments at the Combined Staff planning levels, since the Combined Chiefs
of Staff had directed the Combined Staff Planners to come up with their
recommendations to this same problem.s3
All this talking and memorandum writing and planning took time. The
Joint planning effort to provide major defensive positions of groups of
islands along the line of communications to Australia was not even partially
agreed upon until the end of March 1942, and it was early May before the
= COMINCH to C/S USA, memorandum, Al&3/1/00149 of 2 Mar. 1942.
= (a) Post ARCADIA Vol. 1, minutes of meeting; (b) CC.!+4th Meeting. 10 Feb. 1942.