US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

Planning for War, 1940–1 941 159
in the 12 months between December 1940 and December 194I, despite the
pleas of the military commanders responsible for defense in the Far East
area.g
The paper also pin-pointed the reality of the danger of imposing “important”
economic sanctions, the effect of which the Japanese formally stated
was the immediate cause of their deciding upon war, in order to ensure their
industrial livelihood. And made clearer now is the background reason for
the many false denials made during 1941 that there were definite contingent
arrangements with the Dutch and British for the defense of the Dutch-
Malaysia area.
The rapidity with which Japan overran Malaysia is often stated to have
been a surprise to the military. But, Turner and McNarney ofiered the
opinion:
Provided the British and Dutch cooperate in a vigorous and etlicient defense
of M&ysia, Japan will need to make a major effort with all categories of military
force to capture the entire area. The campaign might even last several
months.
Since Singapore surrendered on 15 February 1942 and Java surrendered 9
March 1942, the forecast was uncannily accurate.
The hazard of orienting United States forces toward the Pacific was
indicated.
Should we prepare for a full offensive against Japan . . . the length of
time required to defeat Japan would be considerable. . .
If Great Britain should lose in Europe, we would then be forced to re-orient
toward the Atlantic, a long and hazardous process.
For this reason, and in view of the existing situation in Europe, the Secretaries
of State, War and Navy are of the opinion that war with Japan should be
avoided if possible. Should we find that we cannot avoid war, then we should
undertake only a limited war.
Their specific recommendations were:
1. The United States . . . should pursue a course that will most rapidly
increase the military strength of both the Army and the Navy . . . and
refrain from any steps that will provoke a military attack upon us by any other
power.
2. The United States ought not willingly engage in any war against Japan.
3. That, if forced into a war with Japan, the United States should, at the
same time, enter the war in the Atlantic, and should restrict operations in the
mid-Pacific and the Far East in such a manner as to permit the prompt move-
“ CNO to SECNAV, Op–12–WCB, letter, Ser 08212 of 17 Jan. 1941, subj: Recommmdations
concerning further reinforcement of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet.