US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

522 Amphibians Came To Cotiqtier
15 other officers in the picture six: Captain John C. Erskine, USMCR,
whom Merrill relieved, Gard, Gordon, Smith, Dromgrool, and Bell, have
been identified by two or more members. Three more: Braun, te Green,
and Henry have been identified or guessed at by one or more members.
Numbers 9, 12, 19, and 25 in the photograph have not been identified.
One Marine otlicer, Captain Gard, was placed in three different positions,
before he was located in Hong Kong and identified himself.
AMPHIBIOUS FORCE GENERAL PLAN
The amphibious plan changed a number of times as the information or
intelligence brought in by the reconnaissance patrols in regard to the New
Georgia Group expanded or changed. To a tnarked extent, the Scheme of
Maneuver agreed upon by Rear Admiral Turner and Major General Harmon
and later by Major General Hester was determined by such hard physical facts
as depth of water, reefs, beach gradients, numbers of troops or amounts of
supplies which could be landed on narrow beaches, possible beach exits into
dense jungle, jungle trails, jungle clearings, or possible bivouac areas.”
A major problem with the new large landing craft (LSTS and LCTS)
was in finding beach gradients where they could land their cargo through
the bow doors, and in finding breaks in the mile-long reefs. Munda Bar was
another mental and physical hazard which tempered a desire to make a
frontal attack on the airfield as had been done at Guadalcanal. Older British
charts dating back to 1900 had shown three to seven fathoms over Munda
Bar which would have permitted comfortable passage by destroyer-type fast
transports and large landing craft, but more recent reports cast doubt on
these depths and the best information was that there was only an unmarked
300-foot wide passage over the bar with 18 feet of water at high tide and
15 feet at low tide.”
Major discussion during the early part of the long planning period before
Vice Admiral Halsey issued his Op Plan 14–43 centered on:
a. whether a frontal assault on Munda could be attempted.
b. the provision of close air and gun support during the first couple
of days of an assault landing.
Close air support by land-based planes directly from Ckadalcanal was
“ CTF 31 Op Plan A8-13, i Jun. 19.13; Op Order A9–13, 15 Jun. 1943; and Op Plan AI I–43,
28 Jun. 1943 and all changes thereto.
44Intelligence Map, Munda Point, Sheet 2, HO, 2907, Pack III. NHD.