US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

398 Amphibians Came To Conq~er
Admiral Turner opined:
The Navy made a defensive decision; the Marines made a defensive decision.
Each one helped to bring on months of hard and costly defensive and
then offensive fighting. In the long run, both tights were won.lle
SAVO—RETROSPECT
Considering the number of rear admirals whose performance in action
during World War II failed to reach the high standards set by Admiral
King and Admiral Nimitz and who were peremptorily removed from com-
mand or gently eased into non-battle assignments, it is quite apparent that
had Rear Admiral Turner actually made a major mistake on that fateful
evening of 8 July 1942, that Admiral King or Admiral Nimitz would not
have kept him at sea in one of the more important combat assignments
throughout the war.
When the captains of opposing football teams meet in the center of the
field before the game starts, the referee tosses a coin, the designated captain
calls “heads” and the coin turns up “tails.”’ This captain has made a bad
guess but not a culpable mistake in judgment. The coach doesn’t bench him
because of his bad guess.
The Battle of Savo Island was primarily a United States Navy defeat.
All of the dozen “causes” listed earlier contributed to this defeat. Beyond
the U.S. Navy, the Australian Navy and Air Force and the United States
Army Air Force also contributed to setting the stage of the defeat.
As Commander of Task Force 61, under the Navy code, Rear Admiral
Turner bore a command responsibility for whatever success was attained
or failure suffered. He did not shrink from his command responsibility. He
vigorously set about correcting those matters of operations, training, materiel
and personnel which were within his purview, and recommending action
in other areas.
Savo Island was a defeat. Guadalcanal was a victory. The important thing
was to learn and apply every possible lesson from both. 1I7
‘e Turner.
“7Turner.