US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

Success, Then Cliff Hanging 351
to Tulagi. According to the Marine Corps Monograph: “The rest of the
battalion had been parceled out to various regiments as reinforcing elements.”
With this disposition of Marine labor resources specially trained and
needed for the unloading of logistic support from ship’s boats, it is not
surprising that logistic chaos took over at the beachhead. This was only
partially alleviated when Captain Reifsnider ordered each transport and cargo
ship to land 15 sailormen to assist in handling supplies at the beachhead.GO
Commander Transports summarized one aspect of the problem:
The statement of the Assistant Beachmaster from the George F. Elliott that
literally hundreds of Marines were sitting on the beach watching tKe confusion
mount, while hundreds of others were roaming through the cocoanut
groves etc., is confirmed by reports of officers sent ashore by me to
investigate .61
The Boat Group Commander, USS Barnett wrote:
There were approximately fifteen or twenty men unloading boats and about
fifty others in swimming. I beached my boat and started looking for the
Beachmaster who could not be found. While looking for the Beachmaster,
I saw about one hundred men lounging around under the palm trees eating
cocoanuts, lying down shooting cocoanuts from the trees; also playing
around and paddling about in rubber boats. All of these men were Marines
that should have been unloading boats.
*****
About 0600 August 8, commenced to notice canned rations floating around
about one mile off the beach. Upon approaching the beach I found that most
of the supplies which had been unloaded during the night had been dumped
at the low water mark, and as the tide came in, these supplies, which consisted
of many items such as sugar, coffee, beans, cheese and lard which were
all over the sides of the boats lying on the beach, were being ruined.62
The Captain of the Harzter Liggett reported:
After dark conditions reached a complete impasse. It is estimated that
nearly one hundred boats lay gunwale to gunwale on the beach, while another
fifty boats waited, some of these, up to six hours for a chance to land. . . .
No small share of the blame fo_r this delay, which prolonged by nearly
twenty-four hours the period when the ships lay in these dangerous waters,
would seem to rest with the Marine Corps personnel and organization. The
““ (a) First Marine Division Operation Order 742 of 20 Jul. 1942; (b) First Marine Division
Operation Order 5–42 of 29 Jun. 1942; (c) Commanding General, First Marine Division, Final
Report on Guadalcanal Operation, Phase 1 of 24 May 1942 Annex K (3); (d) Zimmerman,
Guadalcatral Campaign (Marine Corps Monograph), p. 46.
0’COMTRANSDIV to SOPACFOR report, FB7–10/A1&3/Ser 063 of 19 Aug. 1942.
e Report of Boat Group Commander, USS Banreltj 13 Aug. 1942.