US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

Planning for Paring the ~apanese Toenaiis 487
Georgia, and the 30th of June before Rendova and other islands in the New
Georgia Group were invaded on schedule.
But in the four months from late February to late June 1943, much new
meat was put in the grinder for future operations by the Joint Chiefs, only a
small portion directly concerned with the South and Southwest Pacific. So it
was not until the end of March 1943 that the Amphibious Force of the South
Pacific, and other interested commands learned just what they were to do,
although even then no definite time schedule was provided.
TALKING IT OVER AT A HIGH-LEVEL
On 12 March 1943, the Pacific Military Conference opened in Washington,
D. C., with considerable talent present from the major commands of the
Pacific. The chore was to examine, discuss, and if possible, decide upon
ELKTON, which was General MacArthur’s plan for carrying out Phase Two
and Phase Three of the Joint Chiefs’ 2 July 1942 directive for PESTILENCE.
The Navy planners sat back and drooled as General MacArthur’s Chief
of Staff set forth the considerable forces, particularly Army Air Forces,
needed to carry out the ELKTON Plan. All during Phase One of the PESTI-
LENCE Operation,’” the SOPAC Navy felt that the Army Air Forces had
short changed their needs in the South Pacific in favor of the bomber offensive
against Germany. It was a distinct pleasure to hear the Army planners,
in effect, saying that in order to move forward toward Rabaul, it would take
about twice the then current allocation of air strength in the SOPAC-SOU-
WESPAC Areas.
Out of nearly ten days of proposal and counter-proposal and a meeting of
some of the Pacific planners with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 21 March 1943
came, in effect, a reaffirmation of Phase Two of the Joint Chiefs’ PESTI-
LENCE directive of 2 July 1942 and a requirement that it should be accom-
plished during 1943.
However, the Joint Chiefs made it clear that a new start was being made
by canceling the old 2 July 1942 directive. They issued a new directive for
an operation labeled CARTWHEEL, an operation for ( 1) the seizure of
the Solomon Islands up to the southern portion of Bougainvillea and (2)
driving the Japanese out of certain specific areas in New Guinea and in
Western New Britain. The Joint Chiefs made it equally clear that only a
‘“COMINCH, Memo for General Marshall, 2 Feb. 1945.