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US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

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<strong>The</strong> CTF 62 Op Plan stated:<br />

Logistics: August 1942-February 1943 411<br />

<strong>The</strong> [TF 62] HEADQUARTERS radio station will be established using the<br />

FIRST MARINE DIVISION TBW radio equipment.<br />

<strong>The</strong> McCazuley’s communication facilities were meager enough, but they<br />

were several times larger than the two TBW’S which would be available<br />

on Guadalcanal for use by CTF 62 if he went ashore and the McCawley<br />

departed. So at the same time the decision was made to withdraw all surface<br />

amphibious forces from Guadalca~al, Rear Admiral Turner made the hard<br />

decision to withdraw himself and TF 62 Staff.’8<br />

Support that this ‘second guess’ decision was correct and that the radio<br />

facilities being taken into Guadalcanal were inadequate, even without CTF<br />

62’s communication load, is found in the extracts below from a four-page<br />

mailgram picture of the Guadalcanal communication situation on 28 August<br />

1942.<br />

From RDO Guadalcanal<br />

To COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC<br />

220400<br />

Naval communication facilities available in the Solomons on 20 August<br />

1942.<br />

*****<br />

Radio facilities are daily becoming more inadequate.<br />

*****<br />

Captured Jap receiver utilized to copy FOX.<br />

*****<br />

We hope to improve our situation somewhat by the repair of a Japanese<br />

2 kilowatt transmitter.<br />

Rear Admiral Turner was grateful thereafter that he had withdrawn<br />

because he was able to do a far more comprehensive job of logistic support<br />

from Noumea than he could have done from Guadalcanal, although he<br />

knew that some <strong>Marine</strong>s thought and said he had run away.”<br />

Guadalcanal logistics over the long haul centered on troops, planes, food,<br />

ammunition, and aviation gas, but during the first two weeks, getting the<br />

airfield into condition to operate aircraft received highest priority. This<br />

latter chore the Japanese had not quite accomplished.<br />

From the aerial photographs, an estimate had been made that the airfield<br />

being built by the Japanese would be ready to operate aircraft on 15 August<br />

1942. This was an excellent estimate and does ~ome unknown photographic<br />

M(a) Turner; (b) Staff Interviews.<br />

WTurner.

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