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US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

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Save—<strong>The</strong> Galling Defeat 401<br />

against hope that Ghormley would say ‘No’ to Fletcher and tell him to stay<br />

around for another 24 hours. I had no idea that Fletcher had been heading<br />

southeast all late afternoon and evening and was well south of San Cristobal<br />

by 2300. That information would have been most valuable to me and to all<br />

the Screening Group. But Fletcher didn’t send it to me, Ghormley’s reply<br />

approving Fletcher’s withdrawal didn’t come in until about 0330, and by<br />

that time Iron Bottom Sound had its first contingent [of our ships] .’2”<br />

Admiral Turner believed that the major effect of Vice Admiral Fletcher’s<br />

announced intention of withdrawal on the actual Battle of Savo Island was<br />

that it resulted in Rear Admiral Crutchley not being with his Screening<br />

Group at the particular time the Japanese struck. It was his opinion that<br />

this was a serious loss of command ability, command cohesion, command<br />

knowledge of the situation, and command offensive response,<br />

As for the effect after the Battle of Savo Island, Rear Admiral Turner<br />

had said frequently during the war, and the man continued to say in 1$)60,<br />

that the withdrawal permitted Mikawa’s Cruiser Force “to live and enjoy<br />

their victory.” ‘“<br />

Admiral Turner thought that there were a number of major lessons which<br />

he had learned out of the WATCHTOWER Operation, but that not every-<br />

body would agree with him. His key thoughts in 1960 related to organization.<br />

<strong>The</strong> basic task force organization established by COMSOPAC placed Commander<br />

Expeditionary Force and the Commander Aircraft Force, South<br />

Pacific at the same level in the command echelon. At the next lower level<br />

were Commander Air Support Force and the Commander Amphibious Force.<br />

Over the years, Admiral Turner came to believe that the basic task organization<br />

established by COMSOPAC was faulty in at least one respect and<br />

that was:<br />

at the top level, where the major element of air reconnaissance in the SOPAC<br />

area was not under the operational control of the Commander Expeditionary<br />

Force.<br />

To this was added a grasping at might-have-been straws:<br />

Had TF 63 [the air reconnaissanceforce] been included in the Expeditionary<br />

Force, perhaps Frank Jack {Fletcher] would have felt more like an Expeditionary<br />

Force commander and assumed a greater responsibility for sticking<br />

with the whole Force through to a success.<br />

Finally, Admiral Turner commented:<br />

Unity of command increases the chances for victory. <strong>The</strong> shore-based aircraft<br />

under General MacArthur’s commmd was ir large percentage of the total<br />

‘a Turner.<br />

‘q Turner.

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