29.01.2013 Views

US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

WATCHTOWER 241<br />

the New Hebrides or Ellice Island groups worried the Naval Planners, New<br />

Caledonia was well within air range from the New Hebrides, being only<br />

300 to 400 miles away to the South. <strong>The</strong> Fijis were at the extreme air range<br />

from Funafuti in the Ellice Islands, 560 miles to the North.<br />

Ten days before Singapore fell, Admiral King forwarded a Navy War<br />

Plans Division paper, d;afted by Rear Admiral Turner, to the Joint Chiefs,<br />

recommending the establishment of an advance base at Funafuti in the Ellice<br />

Islands to provide:<br />

a. an outpost coverage of Fiji—Samoa.<br />

b. a linkage post toward the Solomon Islands.<br />

c. support for future offensive operations in the Southwest Pacific.Z*<br />

Three days after Singapore fell to the Japenese on 15 February 1942,<br />

Admiral King proposed to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, that the Tonga<br />

Islands, 200 miles southeast of the Fijis, and Efate, 500 miles to the west<br />

of the Fijis in the New Hebrides, be garrisoned. He asked that the Chief of<br />

Staff<br />

agree to this proposition, and immediately initiate planning and the assembly<br />

of troops and equipment, with a view to dispatching these garrisons as soon<br />

as necessaryshipping can be found.z7<br />

<strong>The</strong> day before Admiral King signed this letter, Brigadier General Eisen-<br />

hower who was to fleet up to be Chief of the Army War Plans Division on<br />

16 February 1942 was recording:<br />

<strong>The</strong> Navy wants to take all the islands in the Pacific-have them held by<br />

Army troops, to become bases for Army pursuit and bombers. <strong>The</strong>n! the Navy<br />

will have a safe place to sail its vessels. But they will not go further forward<br />

than our air (Army) can assure superiority.26<br />

It was Admiral King’s position that the vital line of communications<br />

through Samoa, Fiji, and New Caledonia was “too exposed” to air raids<br />

arising after the anticipated Japanese seizure of intermediate and nearby<br />

islands and that Tongatabu in the Tonga Islands would be the ideal location<br />

for “the principal operating [logistic support} naval base in the South<br />

Pacific.” 2’<strong>The</strong> Tonga Islands were about 1,100 miles along the direct convoy<br />

‘JCS 5.<br />

n COMINCH to C/S <strong>US</strong>A, letter, FF1/A16/c/FI, Ser 00105 of 18 Feb. 1942, and 00149<br />

of 2 Mar. 1942.<br />

a Quoted in Matloff and Snell, S~mtegic Planning, p. 154.<br />

= King’s Record, pp. 377, 383.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!