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US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

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244 Amphibians Came To Conqner<br />

major part of the 56,000-man garrison force agreed upon (41,000 Army;<br />

15,000 <strong>Marine</strong>s) arrived at their islands .3’<br />

<strong>The</strong> basic disagreement separating the Army and the Navy Planners<br />

during this period was whether holding Australia was vital to the United<br />

States war effort. Rear Admiral Turner believed it was. As late as 28 February<br />

1942, Brigadier General Eisenhower, did not agree. He advised General<br />

Marshall:<br />

<strong>The</strong> United States interest in maintaining contact with Australia and in<br />

preventing further Japanese expansion to the Southeastward is apparent . . .<br />

but . . . they are not immediately vital to the successful outcome of the war.<br />

<strong>The</strong> problem is one of determining what we can spare for the effort in that<br />

region, without seriously impairing performance of our mandatory tasks.35<br />

Rear Admiral Turner believed that maintaining contact with Australia<br />

was a mandatory task in view of the deteriorating British, Dutch and Ameri-<br />

can military situation in the Far East. This, fortunately, was also the view of<br />

President Roosevelt, who on 16 February 1942, advised Prime Minister<br />

Churchill: “We must at all costs maintain our two flanks-the right based<br />

on Australia and New Caledonia and the left on Burma, India and China.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> President did not go along, however, with Rear Admiral Turner’s thinking<br />

that “No further reinforcements {should] be sent to Iceland and the<br />

United Kingdom until Fall.’’”<br />

Not only were Rear Admiral Turner and Admiral King pressuring the<br />

Army during February 1942 for more positive action in the Pacific, but<br />

they were also pressuring Admiral Nimitz, and through him, subordinate<br />

Naval commanders in the Pacific. On 12 February 1942, CINCPAC was told:<br />

= (a) Order Troops Troops<br />

Issued Sailed Arrived<br />

American Samoa (<strong>Marine</strong>) 21 Dec. 41 6 Jan. 42 19 Jan. 42<br />

Bora Bora, Society Islands 8 Jan. 42 27 Jan. 42 12 Mar. 42<br />

Noumea, New Caledonia 17 Jan. 42 22 Jan. 42 12 Mar. 42<br />

Tongatabu, Tonga Islands 12 Mar. 42 10 Apr. 42 9 May 42<br />

Western Samoa (<strong>Marine</strong>) 17 Mar. 42 9 Apr. 42 8 May 42<br />

Efate, New Hebrides 20 Mar. 42 12 Apr. 42 4 May 42<br />

Viti Levi, Fiji Islands 28 Apr. 42 May 42 10 June 42<br />

New Caledonia, 22,000; Bora Bora, 4,000; Christmas Island, 2,000; Canton, 1,100; Tongatabu,<br />

7,200; Efate, 4,9oo; Samoa, 13,5oo (<strong>Marine</strong>s). 32,000 of the 41,000 Army were ““ground troops”;<br />

(b) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, pp. 147-54; Miller, Guadalcanal: <strong>The</strong> FirJt Offensive,<br />

p. 24; (c) COMINCH, memorandum, FF I/Al 6-3/Ser 0019 of 17 Mar. 1942.<br />

= Quoted in Matloff and Snell, Str#egic Planningjp. 157.<br />

M(a) Turner; (b) Roosevelt to Churchill, 16 Feb. 1942 in Robert E. Sherwood, Roofeueh and<br />

Hopkins: An Intimufe Hi~tory (New York: Harper & Bros., 1948), p. 508; (c) Turner to<br />

King, memorandum, 17 Feb. 1942; subj: PacificOcean Area.

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