US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

He urged
Piann2ng for War, 1940–1941 177
that the despatch of United States armed forces for intervention against
Japan in China be disapproved, [and] that no ultimatum be delivered to
Japan.”
On 25 November 1941, Turner drafted a despatch to the Commander in
Chief of the Asiatic Fleet for release by the CNO, which contained the
words:
I consider it probable that this next Japanese aggression may cause an outbreak
of hostilities between the U.S. and Japan.
Admiral Stark took this message to the President—who changed the
releaser to himself —and softened the judgment words “probable” to “pos-
sible” and “may” to “might,” and he added the bad guess: “Advance against
Thailand seems the most probable.”
A photostat of the original despatch appears on pages 178-9, together with
a memorandum from the President’s Naval Aide, which indicates that both
the CNO and the Army Chief of Staff (COS) were willing to drop the
statement that war with Japan was “probable.”
The Beardall memorandum to the President showed the ever present
reluctance of the military heads of the Armed Forces to accept the unwanted
but logical conclusion of events, and a reluctance to tell appropriate responsi-
ble outpost officials of such a conclusion.
WILL JAPAN ATTACK THE UNITED STATES?
THE SOVIET UNION?
The Director of War Plans drafted the 24 January 1941 letter, approved
by the Chief of Naval Operations, and signed by the Secretary of the Navy
to the Secretary of War, which said in the first paragraph:
If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities
would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at
Pearl Harbor.’3
When the President made the decision that on 26 July 1941 the United
States would impose economic sanctions against Japan, Rear Admiral Turner
= Gerow and Turner, Memo for President of 5 Nov. 1941, subj: Estimate Concerning Far
Eastern Situation.
mHearings, part 1, SECNAV to SECWAR, letter, 24 Jan. 1941, p. 279.