US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

590 Amphibians Came To Conqzier
Rear Admiral Turner took a dim view of night landings prior to TOE-
NAILS but had not closed his mind to their use. He was willing to experi-
ment on a small scale. So the Eastern Force scheduled a night landing at
Wickham Anchorage and the Western Force scheduled night landings for
the Onaiavisi Entrance Unit and for the Advance Unit on Rendova.
One lesson which Admiral Turner stated he had vividly relearned during
the TOENAILS Operation was the great hazard of night amphibious opera-
tions. In fact, his lack of success with them during TOENAILS soured him
on night landings for any large contingent of amphibians for the rest of
the war.”
In this connection, frequently the question has been raised as to why the
major World War II amphibious assault landings in the South and Central
Pacific were launched at daylight while those in the European Theater were
largely launched during darkness.
It may be that the answer lies in the above observation of Admiral Turner
and in the writings of Sir Roger Keyes. He was the Chief of Staff to the
naval commander at the Gallipoli amphibious landing disaster in 1915.
He later became an Admiral of the Fleet in the British Navy, and before
and after retirement wrote extensively. His opinion was that it was “folly
to storm a defended beach in daylight.” A good many United States naval
officers had read and been impressed by what Sir Roger Keyes wrote. In a
measure, the opinion of General Vandegrift previously quoted, supports
this conclusion.
In the Mediterranean, where the British influence and command lines
were strong, the principle of night landings was observed during the North
African, Tunisian, Sicilian and Italian campaigns.
In the South Pacific there were jungle bordered beaches (with no access
roads) to contend with. In the Central Pacific there was a greater confidence
in the etliciency of naval gunfire, in the dive bombing by carrier aircraft,
in the quality of the close air support provided to the Marines, as well as
a deeper appreciation of the essentiality of landing the troops at the ap-
pointed time and spot to facilitate the Marine and Army Scheme of Maneuver.
(D) Landing Where the Enemy Ain’t
Admiral Turner later commented on Samuel Eliot Morison’s statement
7’ Turner.