US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

WATCHTOWER 235
The secret document containing this general statement of the American-
British strategy was the only one of the 12 papers approved at the ARCADIA
Conference carrying the eye-catching instructions that it was “to be kept
under lock and key” and its circulation “restricted to the United States and
British Chiefs of Staff and their immediate subordinates.” This same docu-
ment mentioned 1943 as the agreed upon year for a “return to the continent
of Europe,” which in effect meant no real counter-offensive against the
Japanese until 1944 or later, since Germany had to be defeated on the
continent of Europe first .13The restrictive instructions in regard to this document
were closely observed in the Headquarters of Admiral King with the
result that some echelons of the Staff were unaware for some weeks of this
1943 European invasion provision. Consequently, they kept up pressure for
“seizing points of vantage” in 1942, to be used later in what they anticipated
would be a 1943 offensive against the Japanese.
ADMIRAL KING PERSISTS
It was Admiral Turner’s belief that Admiral King was the persistent
influence at the Joint Staff and Presidential level, which resulted in the initia-
tion of an amphibious counter-offensive in the Pacific Ocean Area during the
late summer of 1942.’4 But Admiral King received welcome and somewhat
unexpected help from the British, and the right nudge at the right time from
the Japanese. Not until the British influence was made felt at the Presidential
level did the Army Planners, in good conscience, wholeheartedly join in the
vital start to eventual amphibious success in the Pacific.
There are many dates to record and events to recall in connection with the
first counter-offensive operation against the Japanese. But the first date
relating to PESTILENCE is 11 January 1942. On this date Admiral King
figuratively stood on his feet at the ninth meeting of the ARCADIA Con-
ference and talked not about Guadalcanal, but about New Caledonia, 800
miles to the southeast of Guadalcanal. Lieutenant General H. H. Arnold,
Chief of Army Air Corps, had questioned the high priority assigned to the
Army Air Force contingent of aircraft planned for New Caledonia whose
defense was an accepted Australian responsibility, but one the Australians
could not fulfill. The French had agreed, on 24 December 1941, to United
“ Ibid., para. 17.
“ Turner.