US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

HUDDLE Slowly Scuttled 437
3. There was a very real positive value to be obtained from the establishment
of United States air bases in the Santa Cruz Islands and their use for
air seareh to locate any Japanese Expeditionary Force movements from the
Marshall Islands southeastward towards the Fiji and Samoan Islands.’
It is interesting that COMSOPAC’S reaction to this cryptographic infor-
mation seemingly was the same, since based on this despatch he told CTF 61
(Fletcher) to give consideration to an early end of Phase One and the
commencing of Phase Two (HUDDLE) of Operation Plan 1–42.3
As early as 14 June, Vice Admiral Ghormley had advised COMINCH
that he desired “to initiate an advance through New Hebrides, Santa Cruz
and Ellice Island.” He was still of the opinion that the Santa Cruz Islands
were important when Rear Admiral Turner talked with him in Auckland in
mid-July 1942 and he remained convinced of it up to the day of his detach-
ment as COMSOPAC.4
At the 26 July conference regarding WATCHTOWER which Fletcher
(1906), Noyes (1906), McCain (1906), Turner (1908), Kinkaid (1908),
Vandegrift, USMC, Crutchley (Royal Navy), and Callaghan (1911) held
at sea off Koro on 26 July, the questions of the forces to be finally assigned
HUDDLE and the D-Day for the HUDDLE Operation were discussed.
Callaghan’s notes to the Area Commander in regard to these points were as
follows :
Movement to Ndeni to be started night of D-Day if possible. Much argument
about need of whole Znd Marines. Brought up Peck’s point of using
one battalion for this purpose-was voted down as all agreed that this must
be held strongly account of its position and probability of major attack on it.’
This planning in regard to Ndeni had gone forward despite the fact that
on 6 July 1942 COMAIRSOPAC had reported that actual reconnaissance of
the Santa Cruz Islands and the islands to the south had disclosed that air-
field sites were going to be hard to come by. Only two heavily wooded
areas, one on Ndeni and one on Trevanion Island, were possibilities.e
When the Marines were having real difficulties at Tulagi-Gavutu on
D-Day, Major General Vandegrift requested from CTF 62 (Turner) the
release of one battalion from the Force Reserve, the 2nd Marine Regiment,
‘Turner.
*COMSOPAC to CTF 61, 272211 Jul. 1942.
‘ (a) COMSOPAC to COMINCH, 140614 Jun. 1942; (b) Turner
‘ Ghormley manuscript, p. 67.
nCOMAIRSOPAC to COMSOPAC, 060145 Jul. 1942.