US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

Logistics: August 1942-Febraary 1943 417
The facts were a bit different at least in one respect.
On 15 August a week after landing, the Landing Force had 17 days of
regular field rations available in addition to three days of Type C rations
and 10 days of captured Japanese rations.32
By the second half of September, according to General Vandegrifts’
report:
During this period, six weeks after the initial attack, rations were adequate
and three full meals were served daily, . ..33
Actually, then, it took only half of three months, until September 18th,
before the Marines were placed on full U. S. rations. No Marine or Army
soldier ever seemed to have quite enough logistic support during WATCH-
TOWER, but the major essentials of battl~adequate men, rations, air-
craft, bullets, bombs and aviation gasoline-were always present on Guadal-
canal although the reserve stocks rode the sine curve roller coaster with
distressing speed.
Noumea was a logistical bottle neck. It lacked berthing space, storage
space, unloading equipment and adequate numbers of skilled or unskilled
longshoremen. The port was not organized on a Joint basis, and until this
was done in November 1942, each Service competed at Noumea for use
of each ingredient of logistical support.
Cargo ships to make the run to Guadalcanal were another bottleneck.
This was true from Dog Day on, and to make matters worse, on 9 Septem-
ber 1942 the word came in from CINCPAC that COMINCH desired a
regiment of experienced amphibious troops and a division of transports and
cargo ships made ready for transfer to General MacArthur’s command in
the Southwest Pacific Area for his use in forthcoming offensive operations.
This led to some soul searching at the SOPAC level, and when passed down
to Rear Admiral Turner for a recommendation, he came up with a long-
-winded despatch which, in effect, said:
No ships available now or later, and no Marines until I October, and then
only the 8th Regiment of Marines, who aren’t combat trained.3q
At the same time, the Pacific Fleet was meeting an earlier call on its
inadequate resources to provide amphibious ships for the TORCH Novem-
ber 1942 landings in North Africa. CINCPAC looked to the SOPAC Area
for replacements. COMPHIBFORSOPAC pleaded his case noting that his
“ COMGENFIRSTMARDIV Final Report on Guadalcanal Operation, Phase III, Annex C.
= (a) Ibid., Phase V, Annex T; (b) Hough, Ludwig, Shaw, Pearl Harb.r to Gnada!catzal
(Marines), pp. 311-13.
u COMPHIBFORSOPAC to COMSOPAC, 092300 Sep. 19~2 and referenced dispatches.