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US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

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530 Amphibians Came To Conquer<br />

all Services must consider themselves part and parcel of SOPAC forces and<br />

that there be communal use of all supplies and facilities. Additionally, the<br />

Army now placed in charge, and with time and more adequate personnel<br />

on its side, brought order out of chaos in the port at Noumea. <strong>The</strong> port at<br />

Espiritu Santo was also gradually beginning to function satisfactorily. On<br />

23 June 1943, COMSOPAC advised the Vice Chief of Naval Operations<br />

that abnormal delays of shipping there were no longer anticipated.”<br />

Commander Eastern Force was given the logistic responsibility for “em-<br />

barking troops and supplies from the Russells destined for the support of<br />

TOENAILS” after the initial movement, and for all movements to Viru<br />

Harbor, Segi Point, and Wickham Anchorage. Commander Western Force<br />

controlled other logistic support movements into the objective area, and<br />

was responsible overall for the movement of troops and supplies to New<br />

Georgia Island. <strong>The</strong> Commanding General Guadalcanal was directed to<br />

support the operation by making available supplies in the Guadalcanal-<br />

Russell Islands area and furnishing the necessary labor details for loading<br />

or transshipment. And finally, in contradistinction to WATCHTOWER,<br />

there were 1st Echelon, 2nd Echelon, 3rd Echelon, and 4th Echelon logistic<br />

support movements set up for the TOENAILS Operation, prior to Dog Day.<br />

THE JAPANESE<br />

During the pre-invasion period,<br />

CHANGE OUR PLANS<br />

on 20 June, Rear Admiral Turner learned<br />

by radio from a coastwatcher that three barge loads of Japanese troops had<br />

landed at Segi Point and that the coastwatcher needed help to stay out of<br />

their clutches. In order to provide the help and ensure that the enemy would<br />

not have an opportunity to dig in, Rear Admiral Turner made the immediate<br />

decision to land <strong>Marine</strong>s at Segi Point the next morning (21 June). This<br />

was nine days before D-Day for the main landings at Rendova. <strong>The</strong> change<br />

was considered necessary to ensure possession of this particularly desirable<br />

fighter-airstrip real estate and to be able to proceed promptly to build the<br />

ah-strip to provide for close fighter aircraft air support during the landing<br />

operation against Munda or Vila.<br />

<strong>The</strong> need for this close air support had to be balanced against the<br />

disadvantage of possibly tipping off the Japanese on the nearness of the<br />

impending Rendova attack. While the airstrips at the Russell Islands were<br />

“ COMSOPAC to VCNO, 230006 June 19.i3.

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