US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

Savo—Tbe Galling Defeat 377
The basic task was protection of the transports and cargo ships by the
Screening Group irrespective of the approach route of a Japanese surface
force. A plan which protected only against the particular approach chosen
by the Japanese would not have passed muster.
In this connection, it is worth noting that the Japanese battle plan called
for a division of their attack force into two attack groups and that they did
so divide. As the Japanese stated it:
Crudiv 6 was to attack the transports at GUADALCANAL, while Crudiv 18
was to attack the TULAGI transports.
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It was the original plan for the FURATAKA group [Crudiv 6] to take the
outer course, but they took the inner course. I do not know why. I was with
the inner group on the TENRYU [Crudiv 18] .58
In March 1943, in response to a long questionnaire from Admiral
Hepburn, Rear Admiral Turner wrote:
The difficulty of having two national services in one organization is recognized.
It is believed that this was a mistake, although it was felt at the time
that Admiral Crutchley’s force [Task Force 44] probably was a more effective
tactical unit than the remainder of the force [Task Force 62], which had
never operated together, and whose vessels were from several task forces in
both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. In connection with the matter of employing
Admiral Crutchley’s force in Task Force Sixty-Two, I made the specific
recommendation to Admiral Fletcher that all units assigned to me should be
from the U. S. Navy. See my despatch 200135 of July. This recommendation
was not approved. so
Until someone comes forward with a workable alternate plan whereby
the three approaches to the two groups of unloading transports could all be
covered by an undivided Screening Group, labeling the division of the
Screening Group a mistake is an opinion of one uninformed (a) of the
seagoing standards and procedures of the Australian and United States Navy
in August 1942, or (b) that all the cruisers in TF 62 had not been trained
together, or (c) that all the ships of the United States and Australian Navies
in TF 62 were not fitted with both radar and voice radio, or more probably,
(d) of the lay of the land and depths of water in the Savo area.
Admiral Turner’s reaction to Morison’s comment that Rear Admiral Scott
WUSSBS, Interrogations of Ja@ne$e Oficials,USSBS Interrogation No. 255, Vol. I, p. 255.
(Rear Admiral M. Matsuyama). Hereafter only the USSBS Interrogation No, and the page from
Irzterrogatiom of Japanese Oficiah will be cited.
rnRKT, Memorandum for Admiral Hepburn, Mar, 1943, p, 10, Hepburn Report, Annex F.