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US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

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406 Amphibians Came To Conquer<br />

manders were on the same island, these cliffering instructions from the<br />

higher echelons were confusing.<br />

At the Navy Department end:<br />

<strong>The</strong> various Joint plans [for the establishment of defense and logistic support<br />

of island bases] did not, however, constitute a general supply procedure, nor<br />

did they stipulate in any detail the channels through which supply would be<br />

furnished.’<br />

In other words the assigned Army, Army Air <strong>Corps</strong>, Naval, <strong>Marine</strong>, and<br />

New Zealand korces for these island bases did not have Unified, or Joint,<br />

logistic support, Each Service at each island base had individual procedures<br />

for its logistic support.<br />

In general, the Army will furnish and transport its own logistic support, plus<br />

rations for Navy personnel, and the Navy its own, plus fuel, diesel and aviation<br />

gasoline.”<br />

At Pearl, before WATCHTOWER was much more than a gleam in<br />

Admiral King’s eye, CINCPAC recommended to COMINCH a definite<br />

division of responsibility between the Army and the Navy for logistic support<br />

of each individual base in SOPAC by categories of supply.’ In other words,<br />

he wanted a system wherein every island base received its bailing wire from<br />

the Navy and every island base received its coffee from the Army.<br />

From SOPAC, Vice Admiral Ghormley, came the recommendation in<br />

late July 1942 that Auckland, New Zealand, be used for unloading and<br />

resorting material for all Advanced Bases in the SOPAC Area.s Admiral<br />

King, in February 1942, had said that Tongatabu in the Tonga Islands<br />

would serve for this purpose.”<br />

It is presumed the SOPAC recommendation was made because COMSO-<br />

PAC as well as his senior logistical commander, COMSERVRONSOPAC,<br />

and a Joint Purchasing Board were all physically located in Auckland at the<br />

time. It apparently was approved by higher echelons because Auckland<br />

was the only SOPAC base considered safe from Japanese attacks at that<br />

date. But Auckland was 1,100 miles further from San Francisco than<br />

Tongatabu; it was 1,825 miles from Guadalcanal and 250 miles farther<br />

from Guadalcanal than the Tonga Islands.<br />

Commencing in mid-April 1942, the South Pacific Service Squadron under<br />

=Ballantine, U. S. Naval Logi~tics in #be Second World W~cW,<br />

P. 99.<br />

‘ COMSOPAC Op Plan I-42, Logistic Annex.<br />

‘ CINCPAC to COMINCH, 250225 Jun. 1942.<br />

s COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, 260551 Jul. 1942.<br />

0COMINCH to C/S <strong>US</strong>A, letter, FFI A16/CFl Ser 00105 of 18 Feb. 1942.

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