US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

CACTUS Bound 287
our heavy bomber force, sb%ecessaryin this area of great distances between
bases. The Navy Planners’ stand that these heavy and medium bombers
should be based in the South Pacific ready for action was sound. This was
later demonstrated many times. The reason for the Army Planners’ refusal
to agree to the Navy’s proposition was doubtless based on shortage of suitable
aircraft; however this shortage was probably due to the following causes:
a. The need for building up a plane reserve for the African invasion.
b. Lend-lease Commitments to Great Britain and Russia.
c. The unwillingness of the Army Air Corps to place their Squadrons and
groups under naval control.”
It was the plan of the Chief of the Army Air Corps, General Arnold:
To hold the bulk of his heavy bomber strength at each end of the Pacific line,
teady for concentration at any intermediate base. One heavy group, then
assigned to Hawaii, would be available outside the Central Pacific on orders
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff .16
During early July 1942, the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, had directed that
the Hawaiian Mobile Air Force and the Australian Mobile Air Force be
created. This took several weeks for the reluctant Army Air Force to
implement. But, despite reluctance
by July 15th, the 19th Bombardment Group (H) had been designated as a
mobile force in the Southwest Pacific and on the following day the 11th
Group . . . received its designation as Mobile Force, Central Pacific.
Four days later the 1lth Group left Hickam Field for operations from Fiji,
New Caledonia, Efate, and Espiritu Santo.’7
The first B-17 from the Hawaiian Mobile Air Force (1 lth Group) landed
on Espiritu Santo on 30 July 1942, However, the Australian Mobile Air
Force was slow to gain its scheduled strength. It “was never called down
[called over would be more accurate] as were the Hawaiian units.” ‘8
General Arnold’s plan to hold the bulk of his heavy bomber strength at
each end of the Pacific line was the one officially approved by the Joint
Chiefs, but the Joint Chiefs implemented the plan by promptly ordering the
Hawaiian Mobile Air Force to the South Pacific Area. This accomplished a
fair share of the Navy’s desire for more airplanes in the South Pacific Area,
prior to the WATCHTOWER Operation.
n Vice Admiral R. L. Ghormley, manuscript covering the early history of the South Pacific
Force and South Pacific Area, 22 Jan. 1943 pp. 34-35.
“ Air Force, Guadalcanal to Saipan, p. 28.
Hereafter, Ghormley manuscript.
‘7Ibid., pp. 28-29. See also COMINCH to CINCPAC and COMSWPACFOR 032255 Jul. 1942;
a–0221-OUT-I Jul. 1942 ; CM–0741–IN–2
18Air Force, Guddll.afl@l ~0.$diptiw, P. 101.
Ju1. 1942; CM–11oo–OUT–4 Ju1. 1942.