US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

312 Amphibians Ctitne To Conqaer
2.1 million gallons of fuel oil on departure from the Fijis for the Solomons.
CTF 61 considered it “imperative” that his force should be fully fueled on
departure and topped off en route to the landings.”
The Ranier (AE-5 ), Platte (AO-24), and the KanuwLa (AO-1 ) worked
at rearming and refueling the fast carrier task forces on 30 and 31
July, but when, at 1630 on the 31st, the Expeditionary Force started its
decoy course to the southward before turning westward to the Coral Sea
and Guadalcanal, three heavy cruisers and seven destroyers of the fast carrier
task forces still were not fueled. These were temporarily detached and
worked at their task throughout the night. All heavy combatant ships and
three transports were fueled by 1000 on 1 August 1942, but some of the
destroyers had not fueled to capacity.”
On 31 July, Task Group 61.2, the designation of the amphibious forces
while part of the Expeditionary Force, also fueled from our oldest tanker, the
28-year-old Kazrawlu (Commander Kendall S. Reed), and from the Platte
(Captain Ralph H. Henkle) and replenished the ammunition expended in
the rehearsal from the Ranier (Captain W. W. Meek).
The logistical support forces were inadequate, and the problem was
only beginning to be handled at the highest operational level in the task
forces of the Navy. According to the official history of naval logistics:
The vital importance of an adequate supply o,’ fuel, and its timely and
properly allocated delivery to the vessels of the South Pacific for the campaign
about to begin, was clearly recognized by Admiral Ghormley. The
distances involved, the scarcity of tankers, and the consumption of oil by
task forces operating at high speeds made the solution of this logistic problem
difficult enough if the normal operating consumption was used for estimates.
But what would constitute ‘normal’ when the offensive was underway ? . . .
Furthermore, though Ghormley foresaw the situation, and tried to anticipate
it, his Iogistic planners were too few and had too little experience.65
At the late date, 3I July, the Zeiiin and Betelgeuse, carrying essential
Marines and Marine equipment, had not joined and no one in TF 61 knew
where they were, so CTG 61.2 (Turner) directed the heavy cruiser Chicago
(CA-29) (Captain Howard D. Bode) to fly two planes northeast to Suva
to: “ascertain if the Zei[in and Betelgezre are in Suva; if not, does the
Director of the Port know where they are ?“ “
w CTF 61 to COMSOPAC, 280201 Jul. 1942,
“ COMPHIBSOPAC Staff Log.
6’Worrall Reed Carter, Beam, Bullets and Bl~ck Oil (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1951), p. 24.
WRKT to Captain Bode, letter, 31 Jul. 1942.