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US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

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Logistics: August 1942-February 1943 431<br />

Your interesting letter of December twentieth has been received. It is just<br />

the kind of letter I would have expected you to write, and if any proof were<br />

needed, proves that we now have the right man in the very difficult position of<br />

Commander Advanced Naval Base, CACT<strong>US</strong>.’5<br />

Captain William M. Quigley (1911), the next Commander Naval Bases,<br />

Solon-ions, did not arrive until 12 May 1943, and eventually received the pro-<br />

motion to Commodore which had been urged but never approved for his<br />

predecessors. Under his able command, the Naval Bases of the Southern<br />

Solomons further developed and provided highly effective support, both<br />

operational and logistic, for the New Georgia Campaign.ss<br />

Guadalcanal was a tough area for the health of oldsters. Captain Green-<br />

man was 54, and Captain Shock, 50. Commander Compton was only a bit<br />

younger, at 47.<br />

In comparison with the speed and efficiency with which the Navy built<br />

many other Advanced Bases during its sweep up the Solomons and across<br />

the Pacific, it cannot be denied that the building of the CACT<strong>US</strong>-RING-<br />

BOLT Base suffers badly. In second guessing the reasons for the slowness<br />

with which the Advanced Base CACT<strong>US</strong>-RINGBOLT took shape, the four<br />

most apparent reasons are:<br />

1. <strong>The</strong>re was no adequate Base Plan developed by higher echelons<br />

of command prior to the assault landing.<br />

2. <strong>The</strong> Base Area was under Japanese gunfire or air attack a far greater<br />

number of times during the first four months of building than other<br />

bases. <strong>The</strong>re was a definite lack of appreciation by the officer in<br />

over-all charge, Rear Admiral Turner, of the part that defensive<br />

tasks were playing in absorbing the time and energies of the Base<br />

Commander.<br />

3. <strong>The</strong> lack of a clear mission at the Base Commander’s level, with the<br />

immediate senior in command (Major General Vandegrift) being<br />

primarily concerned with work which would contribute promptly<br />

or directly to his offensive or defensive potentialities, and the next<br />

senior in the chain of command (Rear Admiral Turner) keeping a<br />

constant eye to the future use of the Base.<br />

4. A large amount of fuzziness in command lines with five seniors<br />

(COMSOPAC, COMGENFIRSTMARDIV, COMAIRSOPAC,<br />

mRKT to Captain T. M. Shock, letter, 24 Dec. 1942.<br />

WSouth Solomons Sub-Area, Conrmdnd History.

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