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US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

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182 Amphibians Came To Conqrzer<br />

<strong>The</strong> Army G-2 (Chief of Intelligence) had written, as late as 1 November<br />

1941, that Japan would attack Siberia when the ratio of Japanese troops in<br />

Kwantung Province, Manchuria, to Soviet Union troops in Siberia reached<br />

3 to 1, and suggested steps to help China and the Soviet Union.” It is<br />

believed correct to say that, at this time, the Director of War Plans thought<br />

the attack would not take place unless Germany defeated the Soviets in the<br />

West. Such a defeat was in the really questionable stage by I November<br />

1941.<br />

By 27 November 1941, when Rear Admiral Turner participated with<br />

many others in the drafting of the memorandum for the President to be<br />

signed by General Marshall and Admiral Stark, he found no problem in<br />

concurring with the statement:<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is little probability of an immediate Japanese attack on the Maritime<br />

Provinces. . . .<br />

WHO HAS THE BALL? INTELLIGENCE OR WAR PLANS?<br />

Over the years, and occasionally in print, there has been much made of<br />

the fact that the Director of Naval Intelligence had to work through the<br />

Director of War Plans in sending out to the Commander in Chief of the<br />

Pacific Fleet:<br />

specific information, which information might require action by our Fleet or<br />

by our naval forces.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Director of Naval Intelligence said this system was required so that<br />

this information<br />

would not be in conflict with his [the DWPS] understanding of the naval<br />

situation, and the operations for which he was responsible.ss<br />

This requirement irritated greatly some of the second echelon officers in<br />

the Office of Naval Intelligence. <strong>The</strong>y objected both to the Navy system<br />

which channeled political action initiating intelligence through the War<br />

Plans Office, and to the strong-minded officer who occupied the billet of<br />

Director of War Plans.<br />

As for the Navy system, Admiral Ingersoll pointed out:<br />

Our organization was not like Military Intelligence and that the estimate of<br />

the situation should be prepared by the War Plans Division, although the data<br />

“ Hearings, part 14, p. 1361,<br />

m (a) A. A. Hoehling, <strong>The</strong> Week Before Pea~[ Harbor (New York: W. W. Norton & Co,,<br />

1963), p. 61; (b) Pearl Harbor Heai’ingr, part 11, p. 5364.

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