US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

Success, Then C[iff Hanging 347
Japanese bombing attacks at Gzadalcanal, 7-8 Augnst 1942.
Turner Collectmn
The Fighter Director Group aboard the Chicago did not function up to
par on 8 August, after having done well the morning before, and the heaviest
enemy air attack of 45 Bettys and escorting Zekes was not intercepted by
our fighters prior to the delivery of torpedo attacks on Task Force 62,
despite an hour’s advance warning from a coast watcher.
The lack of separate radio frequencies for the Tulagi and the Guadalcanal
Air Support Groups caused much radio interference at times. Admiral
Turner wrote:
. . . there was a patiial ground or short on the antenna of the McCuwley’s
TBS, which was not discovered and remedied until about November, 1942.
The effects of the ground were to cause a rough tone to both reception and
transmission, and to reduce the range of incoming and outgoing messages
from the usual 20 miles to about 8 miles. For example, TBS exchanges
between the McCuwley and ships off Tulagi, 15 miles away, had to be relayed
through a DD of the outer screen of the XRAY Group.sl
The most important lesson learned in close air support in the first two
days of the WATCHTOWER Operation was that it was
51RKT to D~O Admin, enclosure to letter of 2CIAug. 1950, P. 18.