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US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

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addition there were mangrove swamps to overcome just outside of Regi<br />

and again on the far side of the Mango River. By great perseverance the<br />

<strong>Marine</strong>s made it only a day late and captured the 3-inch naval gun guarding<br />

Viru Harbor, in mid-afternoon of I July.<br />

Despite a CTF 31 operational priority despatch to hold the 2nd Echelon<br />

of the Viru Occupation Force at the Russells until informed that Viru<br />

Harbor had been captured, the heavy radio traflic of 30 June prevented the<br />

message getting through in time. This mighty force of one APC and four<br />

LCTS chugged along unaware that the port was still in enemy hands.<br />

<strong>The</strong> LCTS in the 2nd Echelon for Viru Harbor arrived off the harbor<br />

entrance on schedule on 1 July, witnessed one mid-morning six plane air<br />

attack on Japanese-held Tetemara, then proceeded to land their supplies as<br />

soon as the <strong>Marine</strong> attack ended, with the surviving Japanese escaping toward<br />

Munda.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Hopkim and C~o~by arrived back at Viru Harbor at an early 0230<br />

on 2 July but it was 0705 before they landed their Army troops, naval base<br />

units, Seabees, and logistic support for the Occupation Group, two days later<br />

than originally scheduled. <strong>The</strong> usual problems of the amphibians were<br />

present:<br />

Boats deIayed in unloading because of small crowded beach. . . .<br />

*****<br />

Boats reported being fired on by Japanese snipers.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> llopkin~ after completing its chores, picked up the <strong>Marine</strong> wounded<br />

and sped them back to the Russells.<br />

Viru Harbor was indicative of what happened to operational time tables<br />

when land movements through the densely wooded areas of New Georgia<br />

were involved.<br />

None of the ships made action reports. None of them kept war diaries.<br />

<strong>The</strong> logs of the Officers of the Deck and the report of Commander Leith<br />

were the only naval documents located. None of these documents explain<br />

why the Japanese gun positions were not worked over by the three destroyer-<br />

type ships on D-Day, using surface spot. None of them explain how one<br />

lone Japanese 3-inch gun chased away three destroyer-type ships that mounted<br />

a total of twelve 3-inch, albeit the ships were loaded with troops. And<br />

while the despatch instructions were for the troops to be landed at the<br />

Choi River, which would have given the troops a far shorter march, the<br />

‘1(a) Crosby Deck Log, 2 Jul. 1943; (b) COMINERON to CTF 31, 012358 Jul. 1943.

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