US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

156 Amphibians Came To Conqaer
American nation to another despite any changes in management at the home
offices in Europe.
The “Destroyers for Naval Bases” arrangement was finalized on 2 September
1940, and Rear Admiral John W. Greenslade was out in the hustings
developing recommendations for base facilities which would permit a better
United States defense of the Panama Canal, and better United States offen-
sive actions against German submarines. When Rear Admiral Greenslade
submitted his Board’s recommendations on this subject, he was put to
developing a set of recommendations for the location and development of
naval bases for a Two Ocean Navy.
One of the first major tasks which Captain Turner faced was to meet the
request of Rear Admiral Greenslade who
orally requested an indication of the views of the Chief of Naval Operations
as to general strategic matters which might influence the conclusion to be
reached by the Board.i
In view of the fact that the Communists—in effect a non-American foreign
power—have now taken over Cuba, the 1940 opinion of the War Plans
Officer, and of the Chief of Naval Operations is worth quoting:
16. The Caribbean, the southern flank of the Atlantic position, is doubtless
the most important single strategic area which the United States has within its
power to control permanently. Its security is essential for defense against
attack from the eastward upon the Panama Canal, Central America, Mexico
and the southern United States. It is the most advanced location from which
offensive operations can be undertaken for the protection of South America,
or for the disruption of enemy communication lines along the African Coast.
Its importance to the United States can be realized by imagining a situation in
which a strong foreign power would be firmly ensconced therein. . . .
17. The distances around the eastern rim of the Caribbean are such that it
does not seem possible to provide for an adequate defense of the region by
the development of a single operating base area. Preferably, base areas would
be developed in the vicinity of the Northwestern end, in the center, and at the
south eastern end of the rim. The positions that naturally suggest themselves
are around Guantanamo and Jamaica, around Porto Rico, and around Trinidad.
. . .’
ARE WE READY?
The General Board on 1 July 1940, in answer to the pertinent question
of the Secretary of the Navy “Are We Ready ?“ had said “No” in a clear
4CNO to Rear Admiral John W. Greenslade, letter, Ser 045112 of 29 Nov. 1940.
‘ Ibid.