29.01.2013 Views

US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

346 Amphibians Came To Conqiver<br />

and a half squadrons (18 planes) of dive bombers continuously for striking<br />

gun positions in the assault areas and a varying number of fighters, normally<br />

one-half squadron (6 planes), continuously for air cover. Additionally, the<br />

Air Support Group provided one plane over Guadalcanal and one over<br />

Tulagi for air ground liaison with the forces in those areas, as well as an<br />

artillery spotting plane over Guadalcanal, until it was known that the<br />

<strong>Marine</strong> artillery was not to be used. Both the fighters and dive bombers<br />

carried out close air support of the <strong>Marine</strong>s or dropped their bombs on<br />

targets of opportunity before returning to land on the carriers.<br />

<strong>The</strong> basic plan provided that air support for the <strong>Marine</strong>s during the<br />

amphibious. assault phase would be controlled by an air support group<br />

temporarily attached to the staff of the amphibious force commander.<br />

Fighter cover over the assault area was to be controlled by a fighter director<br />

group attached to the staff of the Second-in-Command to the Amphibious<br />

Force Commander. Specifically this meant that control and coordination of<br />

air units in the assault area was exercised by the Air Support Director Group<br />

in the McCawiey, working through the Senior Carrier Air Group Commander<br />

on station over the assault area, who was in airborne command of the aircraft<br />

from the Air Support Group.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Air Controller of the Fighter Director Group from the Air Support<br />

Director Group, at the last moment, had to be stationed in the heavy cruiser<br />

Chicago rather than in Rear Admiral Crutchley’s flagship, the Australia,<br />

because the Australia had a completely inadequate aircraft radar with a<br />

working range of 15 miles. <strong>The</strong> McCawley could not pick up this additional<br />

chore because of inadequate aircraft radio communication channels.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Air Controller in the McCawley had radio communication with the<br />

home base-the carriers—and up and down the naval chain of command<br />

in the combat area, as well as with the <strong>Marine</strong> chain of command, and with<br />

the Senior Carrier Air Group Commander and the liaison planes in the air,<br />

but in part it was step by step communication. He did not have direct voice<br />

communication with all ships nor with lower echelon <strong>Marine</strong> units. <strong>The</strong>se<br />

<strong>Marine</strong> ground units did not have direct communication with the individual<br />

planes circling overhead.<br />

All scheduled air strikes were delivered on time and largely on target.<br />

Some targets had not been minutely described or pin-pointed and so were<br />

not recognized. <strong>The</strong> carrier pilots, not specially trained for this exacting<br />

and difficult air support chore, did not always come up to the expectations<br />

of the <strong>Marine</strong>s, their own desires, or the desires of the top command.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!