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US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

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Sal ’o—<strong>The</strong> Ga[ling Defeat 395<br />

question at the time in regard to the decision, which in view of the necessity<br />

of conserving our carrier strength he viewed then and continues to view<br />

as sound.loz<br />

However, had information become available to the Commander Task<br />

Force 61 (Fletcher) during the night of the Japanese success at Savo Island,<br />

Admiral Kinkaid thinks that the task Force should have been turned north<br />

and every effort made to make air attacks on the retreating Japanese ships<br />

the next morning.’”3<br />

Admiral Fletcher was told by this scribe:<br />

Forrest Sherman, Commanding Ofi3cer of the W’ap, tried to persuade Admiral<br />

Noyes to recommend to you to turn north after the first word was<br />

received of the Japmese surface ships being in the Guadalcanal Area.<br />

<strong>The</strong> author then asked:<br />

Did anyone try to persuade you to do this? Did this thought occur to you ?<br />

Admiral Fletcher’s answer was:<br />

I didn’t know anything about %vo Iskmd happening until about five to six<br />

the next morning, and I couldn’t get through to Kelly Turner by radio and<br />

get details in regard to the Japs. One or two of my staff recommended that we<br />

go back. I said if I was a Jap, I would have planned on all our carriers coming<br />

back and would hit them with all my land based air.<br />

If I had it all to do over ~glin th;lt morning and know about our losses, I<br />

would leave one carrier group behind to fuel, and would move two carrier<br />

groups up to attack and to continue to provide air support to Kelly Turner.<br />

This did not occur to me at the time as being sound,’”’<br />

Rear Admiral Harry Smith, <strong>US</strong>N, Fletcher’s Flag Lieutenant and Signal<br />

Officer in August 1942, stated in May 1963:<br />

For some reason the Saratogu did not or could not copy CTF 62’s blind desp~tches<br />

sent that night, and it wmn’t until other ships sent us the news by<br />

blinker or infrared that we started to get the word ~bout the Battle of Save.<br />

SUMMARY<br />

Considering all these fundamentals, and particularly Admiral Nimitz’s<br />

instructions, Admiral Fletcher, in 1963, still thought:<br />

A defensive decision was in order on 8 August although perhaps not exactly<br />

the one I made at the time.los<br />

‘mKinkaid.<br />

“oIbid.<br />

‘0’Fletcher.<br />

‘WFletcher.

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