US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

To~gh Toenails Paring 591
about the “folly of not taking Laiana first,” and added that the decision to
land at Zanana Beach instead of Laiana Beach was predicated on an accept-
ance, at that stage of the war, of General Vandegrift’s often repeated statement
that
landings should not be attempted in the face of org.nized resistance, if, by
any combination of march or maneuver it is possible to land unopposed and
undetected.72
(E) Weather
Other officers pointed out that bad weather blotted out the special lights
needed to guide landing craft to beaches. Special lights had been provided
at Rendova, Oleana Bay and Rice Anchorage. None were visible in the
manner planned.73
(F) Wshore Toe Holds
During the New Georgia amphibious operation an operational technique
was developed which carried through the Central Pacific campaigns and on
into the planning for the final attack on the Japanese homeland. This technique
was pointed towards seizing toe holds on nearby islands close to but
not so well defended as the main objective and making a key part of the
major assault on the main objective direct from these toe holds rather than
from far across the sea. They also provided a place from where artillery
support could be supplied from on a round-the-clock basis.
(G) Shore Party
The Shore Party had been much condemned for its inadequacies on 7
August 1942 at Guadalcanal. Much effort had gone into making more
definite its duties and increasing the number of warm bodies to carry out
these duties during the next three months. On 16 October 1942, COM-
PHIBFORSOPAC issued a new trial operating procedure for the Shore
n (a) Turner; (b) Morison, Tbe Ri,itig Sun in tbe P~.ific (Vol. 111), p. 199; (c) COMGEN-
FIRSTMARDIV, Final Report on Guadalcanal, Phase V, p. 6.
- (a) Staff Interviews; (h) CTF 31 Op Order A9-43, I> Jun. 1.943. Appendix (1) to
Annex G.