US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

Savo—Tbe Gaiiing Defeat 387
Your . . . not approved. Saratoga must be ready to launch for or in case of
attack. Please carry out my
*****
Saratog~ does not appear to be complying with my orders for today’s operations
which require her until noon to maintain fighters and attack group
ready for launching at all times in case of bombing attack or locating of
enemy CV. Please refer conflicting requests to me.
*****
Red Base again requests eight VF for combat patrol from me. Advise.
*****
Your . . . negative. Invite your attention to present situation if enemy CV
should be located and I ordered your attack group launched. Your fighters
should also be ready for launching for actual bombing attack until noon.az
After the large scale Japanese morning torpedo plane attack against the
amphibious forces on 8 August had been completed, having been met with
devastating surface ship anti-aircraft fire--but a minimum of fighter opposi-
tion—and the results reported to the Expeditionary Force Commander
(Fletcher), he had difficulty being convinced that the Japanese had carried
out such a large scale torpedo plane attack.
He signalled:
Request any information about attack this morning. Were planes actually
carrying torpedoes ?
When assured of the actuality and multiplicity of the torpedoes, including
one that had missed the McCawley’s stern by “about 40 feet,” the Expedition-
ary Force Commander made his decision to recommend withdrawal of the
carriers because of the possibility of new torpedo plane attacks.
If the Expeditionary Force Commander (Fletcher) had not been worried
greatly about there being a Japanese carrier over the horizon, it seems quite
logical that he would have stepped in earlier and suggested to his senior
subordinate ( Noyes ), the Air Support Commander, that 40 Japanese large
twin engine planes were a sufficiently worthy target to justify diversion of
defensive fighters to offensive use.
This Japanese torpedo plane attack was the one which torpedoed the
]arvi~ and directly led to her being sunk the next day, 9 August, by the
Japanese 25th Air Flotilla, with the loss of all hands.
(2) The Fuel Problem–Strawman or Real.
Admiral Turner recalled
Enroute from Koro to the Solomons my big worry was OIL, OIL, 01L.E3
= (a) CTF 61,1 to CTF 16,070120, Aug. 1942; (b) CTF 61.I to Samtogu, 0?2225, Aug.
1942; (C) CTF 61.1 to C’Ill 61.1.1, 072315 Aug. 1942.
a Turner.