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US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

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382 Amphibians Came To Conquer<br />

batteries of the cruisers, and an early alert to the presence of the enemy ships.<br />

In his 21 February 1943 report on the defeat of his forces, Rear Admiral<br />

Crutchley listed four radio message alerts from higher authority in regard<br />

to submarines in the area prior to 7 August, three more alerts on 7 August,<br />

and three further alerts on 8 August.B5<br />

That those on the spot were convinced of an increasing submarine menace<br />

is indicated by CTF 62’s first post-Savo report in which, based on a Mozmen<br />

report, he reported that one enemy submarine was probably sunk.B6 Rear<br />

Admiral Crutchley in his report to Admiral Hepburn wrote:<br />

from information available, submarines appeared the greater menace<br />

~~han a surface ship attack].”<br />

*****<br />

. . . <strong>The</strong> submarine menace was considered so serious that, by order of<br />

Admiral Turner, all cruiser planes except those assigned to liaison duties with<br />

troops were used on the 8th for A/S screen and search for su~marines.es<br />

A survey of all TF 62 action reports indicates that four submarine contact<br />

reports were made in TF 62 on 7 August and six on 8 August 1942.’g<br />

FIRST REACTION TO DEFEAT<br />

Sometimes first reactions are bitter but truthful. In Rear Admiral Turner’s<br />

files, there is the first letter to his immediate senior following the defeat,<br />

written by the Rear Admiral Commanding H. M. Australian Squadron which<br />

contains this paragraph:<br />

Having been placed in charge of the screening forces by you, I have naturally<br />

been searching for my mistakes which may have led to, or contributed<br />

to, this great loss. I feel that undoubtedly there must be some, but there are<br />

to my mind two main points that stand out-one is that fatigue to personnel<br />

caused lack of warning, In an operation of this kind, this is almost inevitable.<br />

<strong>The</strong> other is, that we, U. S. and British, must have practice in night fighting<br />

‘s (a) Crutchley to Turner, report, 21 Feb. 1943, pp. 4, 5, Hepburn Report, Annex B; (b)<br />

COMSOPAC 071142 Aug. 1942; CINCPAC 062336, 080141 Aug. 1942, Hepburn Report,<br />

Annex C.<br />

m (a) CTF 62 to COMSOPAC, 090815 Aug. 1942, Hepburn Report, Annex T; (b) itfot?JJetz<br />

and San ]uan. Action Reports.<br />

e?HePbu~n Report, Para. 82’<br />

w Hepburn Report, para. 89.<br />

69Action Reports of ColbOUn, MonJJen, San Juan, Mtigford, Wihofr, cre~cent CitY> PreJident<br />

Adamj, Little, Neville.

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