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US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

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WATCHTOWER 245<br />

My 062352 [Februar~] is to be. interpreted as requiring a strong and comprehensive<br />

offensive to be launched soon against exposed enemy naval forces<br />

and the positions he is now establishing in the Bismarks and Solomons.37<br />

And again on 15 February:<br />

Current operations of the Pacific Fleet, because of existing threat, should be<br />

directed toward preventing further advance of enemy land airplane base development<br />

in the direction of Suva and Noumea. . . .38<br />

On 26 February CINCPAC was informed:<br />

our current tasks are not merely protective, but also offensive where practicable.<br />

. . .W<br />

THE BRITISH URGE ACTION IN PACIFIC<br />

<strong>The</strong> British also were in agreement with United States naval opinion,<br />

and began to put political pressure on President Roosevelt and military<br />

pressure at the Combined Chiefs’ level to give increasing protection to<br />

Australia and New Zealand, and to step up American naval action in the<br />

Pacific. Both of these were to be done at the expense of “American Army<br />

action in the European <strong>The</strong>ater of Operations.<br />

On 4 March 1942, Prime Minister Churchill advised President Roosevelt:<br />

I think we must agree to recognize that Gymnast [the varying forms of intervention<br />

in French North Africa by Britain from the east and by the United<br />

States acrossthe Atlantic] is out of the question for several months.40<br />

This despatch gave the Navy Planners a talking point, since the GYM-<br />

NAST Operation had a tentative date of 25 May 1942, and was responsible<br />

for overriding Army troop commitments to the European <strong>The</strong>ater.<br />

On 5 March, Mr. Churchill advised the President:<br />

. . . it should be possible to prevent oversea invasion of India unless the<br />

greater part of the Japanese Fleet is brought across from your side of the<br />

theater, and this again I hope the action and growing strength of the United<br />

States Navy will prevent.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> word “action” was needling in effect, whatever its intent. And again<br />

in the same message:<br />

mCOMINCH to CINCPAC, 122200 Feb. 1942.<br />

= COMINCH to CINCPAC, 151830 Feb. 1942.<br />

= COMINCH to CINCPAC, 261630 Feb. 1942.<br />

a Winston S. Churchill, Tbe Hinge o} Fute, Vol. IV of <strong>The</strong> Second World W& (Boston:<br />

Houghton Mif3in Co., 1950), p. 190.<br />

4’Ibid., p. 192.

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