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Sauo—Tbe Gailing Defeat 373
tentions” to justify the conference. In any case, CTF 62 made the decision to
bring CTG 62.6 aboard later.”
Soon thereafter the transports all were underway because of a Japanese air
attack. The transports remained underway until just before 5 p.m.
The problem of bringing CTG 62.6 aboard before dark was discussed
again by CTF 62 with the Staff .48
Just after 6 p.m. (1807) the message came in wherein Vice Admiral
Fletcher recommended to Vice Admiral Ghormley the immediate withdrawal
of all carriers. Rear Admiral Turner hoped that Vice Admiral Ghormley,
looking at the larger picture and attaching more importance to the success of
the whole operation than to the safety of the carriers, would turn Vice
Admiral Fletcher down. However, now it was essential that the Second-in-
Command be called aboard and the changed situation be discussed. This was
done at 2037 in the evening.” One specific question asked Rear Admiral
Crutchley during his 70-minute stay in the McCawley was whether he “considered
the screening ships could stick it out for one or two more days without
carrier air support .”50
Neither the Hepburn Investigative Report, the Naval War College, nor
this writer think it was a mistake for Rear Admiral Crutchley, the Second-in-
Command, to want a conference with his Commander, nor a mistake for his
Commander to grant such a request. It was a necessity. As Admiral Hepburn
stated: ‘‘CTF 62’s need to confer with his senior commanders cannot be
questioned.” 5’
The Naval War College stated: “This action of CTF 62 in calling this
conference was sound.” 52
ENEMYS CAPABILITIES
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE SUGGESTS
1. The enemy’s capabilities, as well as the enemy’s intentions must be
considered. The highest priority must be given by a commander to those
enemy courses of action considered more dangerous to his own force.59
By inference, Commander Task Force 62 did not give adequate weight to
the capabilities of the enemy ‘‘cruiser-destroyer-seaplane force” sighted at
4’Staff Interview.
u Ibid.
49(a) Staff Interview; (b) CTF 62 to CTG 62.6, 080937, Aug. 1942, Hepburn Report,
Annex T.
mRKT to Director Naval History, letter, 1948.
mHepburn Report, para. 84.
MNaval War College, Sduo I-r/drrd, Vol. I, p. 90.
n Ibid.,P. 48.