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US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

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184 Amphibians Came To Conqtier<br />

graphically decoded, and their translations circulated all together, during the<br />

evening of 6 December.<br />

<strong>The</strong> 14th Japanese despatch was decoded and circulated routinely during<br />

the forenoon of 7 December, the limited list of viewers seeing it at various<br />

times. Many, including Rear Admiral Turner, saw it subsequent to the 15th<br />

despatch.<br />

<strong>The</strong> 15th despatch received special expeditious delivery service, when it<br />

had been cryptographically decoded and translated. It was available to<br />

Admiral Stark around 9:30 a.m. the morning of 7 December 1941.<br />

FIRST, THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE<br />

Actually, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Wilkinson,<br />

was not uneasy or agitated by the first 13 parts of the decoded Japanese<br />

despatch. He testified that he<br />

did not consider it a military paper . . . and there was nothing particularly<br />

alarming in those [13] parts. . . . <strong>The</strong> fact that [in the 15th part] there was<br />

a certain time for the delivery was not significant to me. . . . I thought that<br />

the message was primarily of concern to the State Department rather than the<br />

Navy and the Army.”<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is nothing, absolutely nothing in these statements or available elsewhere<br />

from testimony of the DNI (Director of Naval Intelligence) that he<br />

had any desire to send this Japanese summation of position, a Japanese<br />

white paper, on to Pearl Harbor to Admiral Kimmel.<br />

When Rear Admiral Wilkinson saw the 14th part of the Japanese diplo-<br />

matic message on Sunday morning, his reaction, as he remembered it, was:<br />

<strong>The</strong>y were fighting words, so to speak, and I was more impressed by<br />

that language than by the breaking off of negotiations, which of itself<br />

might be only temporary.8z<br />

<strong>The</strong> DNI, being physically present in the Ofice of the CNO, on the<br />

morning of 7 December 194 I said:<br />

I believe that I advised that the Fleet should be notified, not with any question<br />

of attack on Hawaii in mind, but with the question of imminence of hostilities<br />

in the South China Sea.es<br />

At this hour, the Japanese message (the 15th part) telling the Japanese<br />

mIbid., pp. 1874-75.<br />

= Ibid., p. 1766.<br />

m Ibid., p. 1766.

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