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US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

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234 Amphibians Came To Conquer<br />

“<strong>The</strong> necessities of the case call for action in 1942—not 1943.” This meant<br />

SLEDGEHAMMER.”<br />

With this same point of view held strongly in the Army planning staff, it<br />

can be seen how diflicult it was to take the Joint military decision that it was<br />

practical, within United States available resources, to start the offensive-<br />

defensive phase of amphibious warfare in the South Pacific. But this, both<br />

Admiral King, and his tireless subordinate, Rear Admiral Turner, were still<br />

hoping to do.<br />

THE JAPANESE STIR UP THE EAGLE<br />

<strong>The</strong> Joint Staff Planners, in late April 1942, moved to pass on to the Joint<br />

Chiefs their long standing deadlock in regard to “Defense for the Island<br />

Bases along the line of communication between Hawaii and Australia,” when<br />

on 24 April 1942 they agreed that the Joint Staff Plans Committee would<br />

proceed as follows:<br />

Admiral Turner and General Handy will each prepare a memorandum<br />

setting forth their views on certain controversial points, these views to be<br />

incorporated in the paper when forwarded.ss<br />

<strong>The</strong> new draft was ava;lable in the early days of May, and Admiral King<br />

sought General Marshall’s help to resolve the issue since any real acceptance<br />

of the Navy’s position would require a more offensive minded Army Air<br />

<strong>Corps</strong> position, as well as the ground Army, toward the Pacific War.<br />

However, at this point the Japanese came to the support of the Navy<br />

planners’ desire for “action” in the Pacific, particularly a United States move<br />

into the Solomons. <strong>The</strong> 1938 Japanese Basic War Plan, in effect at the start<br />

of the Japanese-United States phase of World War H, called for the occupa-<br />

tion of New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa, as a second phase task following<br />

conquest and consolidation in Malaya, Netherlands East Indies and the<br />

Philippines. <strong>The</strong>se second phase occupations were judged necessary by the<br />

Japanese in order to cut the lines of communication between the United<br />

States and Australia and make feasible Japanese occupation of Australia.<br />

As a start on these second phase tasks the Japanese, in April 1942, orga-<br />

nized for seizing the first stepping-stone 350 miles southward toward New<br />

Caledonia. <strong>The</strong>ir then current positions were at Rabaul in New Britain and<br />

m (a) Churchill, <strong>The</strong> Hitrge O} F~e, pp. 320, 34o; (b) Presidential Memoranda to General<br />

Marshall and JCS, 6 May 1942,<br />

= Joint Planning Staff Meetings, minutes, 24 Apr. 1942.

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