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US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

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232 Amphibians Came To Conquer<br />

<strong>The</strong> author can record that the Naval War Planners, which Rear Admiral<br />

Turner headed (as F-1 on Admiral King’s Staff), and of which the writer<br />

(as F-II on the Plans Division for the first year of the war) was a very<br />

small cog, were under a great deal of professional pressure to make the<br />

concept of offensive amphibious action, as in the Rainbow Plan, live again.<br />

ARMY PLANNERS POSITION<br />

<strong>The</strong> United States Army Planners in Washington 4 in early 1942 took<br />

a dim view of any large scale diversion of Army resources for counteroffensive<br />

purposes in the Pacific Ocean Area, as long as the over-all direc-<br />

tion for the conduct of the war stated that:<br />

1.<br />

24<br />

3.<br />

Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers,<br />

<strong>The</strong> Atlantic and European Area is considered to be the decisive<br />

theater, and<br />

“<strong>The</strong> principal United States military effort will be exerted in the<br />

decisive theater, and operations of United States forces in other<br />

theaters will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that<br />

effort ,”5<br />

<strong>The</strong> Army’s official history makes this position clear.<br />

<strong>The</strong> basic Army position was:<br />

. . . to emphasize the need for economy of effort in “subsidiary’ theaters.<br />

<strong>The</strong>y classified as subsidiary theaters not only the Far East but also Africa, the<br />

Middle East, the Iberian Peninsula, and the Scandinavian Peninsula. . . .<br />

to consider all other operations as strictly holding operations, and to regard<br />

with disfavor any proposal to establish and maintain in a ‘subsidiary’ theater<br />

the favorable ratio of Allied to enemy forces, that would be necessary in order<br />

to take the offensive there.e<br />

‘ Senior Army War Planners in late 1941 and early 1942 included Major General L. T. Gerow,<br />

Chief of War Plans Division, General Staff; Major General Carl Spaatz, Army Air Force;<br />

Brigadier General D, D. Eisenhower, Deputy Chief, War Plans Division, General Statf; Brigadier<br />

General J. T. McNarney, War Plans Division, Army Air Force; Brigadier General R. W. Crawford,<br />

War Plans Division, General Staff; Colonel T. T. Handy, War Plans Division, General<br />

StaE. At this time there was no separate Air Force. <strong>The</strong> Air Force was created from the Army<br />

Air Force on 26 July 1947.<br />

s Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbowl%e, WPL-46, app. I, sec. IV, para. 13a, subj: Concept<br />

of the War.<br />

a Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planningfor Coaii$~onWar/aw 1941–1 942,<br />

Vol. HI in subseries Tbe Wur Department of series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD<br />

WAR 11 (Washington: Otlice of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953),<br />

p. 101-02.

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