US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

158 Amphibians Came To Conquer
the study with a view to its submission to the President for formal approval.
Their estimate “sought to keep in view the political realities in our own
country” where “the strong wish of the American people at present seems
to be to remain at peace.”
The Turner-McNarney study paper was touched off by a “Memorandum
on National Policy” from Admiral Stark to the Secretary of the Navy dated
12 November 1940. This memorandum later became known as “Plan Dog”
since it offered four possible plans of action by the United States in the event
of a two-ocean war, Plan A, B, C, or D, and recommended Plan D, a strong
offensive war in the Atlantic and a defensive war in the Pacific.
The Joint estimate of Turner and McNarney is a remarkable document
in many respects, particularly in forecasting the timing and the various
factors which brought the United States into war.
It stated:
With respect to Germany and Italy, it appears reasonably certain that
neither will initiate open hostilities with the United States, until they have
succeeded in inflicting a major reverse on Great Britain in the British Isles or
in the Mediterranean.
With respect to Japan, hostilities prior to United States entry into the European
War or to the defeat of Britain may depend upon the consequences of
steps taken by the United States to oppose Japanese aggression. If these steps
seriously threaten her [Japan’s] economic welfare or military adventures, there
can be no assurance that Japan will not suddenly attack United States armed
forces.
In connection with a war with Japan, they forecast:
Such a war might be precipitated by Japanese armed opposition should we:
1. Strongly reinforce our Asiatic Fleet or the Philippine garrison.
2. Start fortifying Guam.
3. Impose additional important economic sanctions.
4. Greatly increase our material . . . aid to China.
Or by:
5. A definite indication that an alliance with the British or Dutch had been
consummated.
6. Our opposition to a Japanese attack on British or Dutch territory.
It might be precipitated by ourselves in case of overt Japanese action against
US,or in case of an attempt by Japan to extend its control over Shanghai, or
Indo-China.
Believing as these planners did, it can now be understood why the Asiatic
Fleet was not reinforced and the Philippine Garrison more rapidly built up